Kanad Pardeshi, Itai Shapira, Ariel D. Procaccia, Aarti Singh
{"title":"学习给定心形和序形共识数据的决策函数","authors":"Kanad Pardeshi, Itai Shapira, Ariel D. Procaccia, Aarti Singh","doi":"10.1609/aaaiss.v3i1.31280","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Decision-making and reaching consensus are an integral part of everyday life, and studying how individuals reach these decisions is an important problem in psychology, economics, and social choice theory. Our work develops methods and theory for learning the nature of decisions reached upon by individual decision makers or groups of individuals using data. \n\nWe consider two tasks, where we have access to data on: 1) Cardinal utilities for d individuals with cardinal consensus values that the group or decision maker arrives at, 2) Cardinal utilities for d individuals for pairs of actions, with ordinal information about the consensus, i.e., which action is better according to the consensus. Under some axioms of social choice theory, the set of possible decision functions reduces to the set of weighted power means, M(u, w, p) = (∑ᵢ₌₁ᵈ wᵢ uᵢᵖ)¹ᐟᵖ, where uᵢ indicate the d utilities, w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} denotes the weights assigned to the d individuals, and p ∈ ℝ (Cousins 2023). For instance, p = 1 corresponds to a weighted utilitiarian function, and p = -∞ is the egalitarian welfare function. \n\nOur goal is to learn w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} and p ∈ ℝ for the two tasks given data. The first task is analogous to regression, and we show that owing to the monotonicity in w and p (Qi 2000}, learning these parameters given cardinal utilities and social welfare values is a PAC-learnable task. For the second task, we wish to learn w, p such that, given pairs of actions u, v ∈ ℝ₊ᵈ, the preference is given as C((u, v), w, p) = sign(ln(M(u, w, p)) - ln(M(v, w, p))). This is analogous to classification; however, convexity of the loss function in w and p is not guaranteed. \n\nWe analyze two related cases - one in which the weights w are known, and another in which the weights are unknown. We prove that both cases are PAC-learnable given positive u, v by giving an O(log d) bound on the VC dimension for the known weights case, and an O(d log d) bound for the unknown weights case. We also establish PAC-learnability for noisy data under IID (Natarajan 2013) and logistic noise models for this task. Finally, we demonstrate how simple algorithms can be useful to learn w and p up to moderately high d through experiments on simulated data.","PeriodicalId":516827,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series","volume":"34 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Learning Decision-Making Functions Given Cardinal and Ordinal Consensus Data\",\"authors\":\"Kanad Pardeshi, Itai Shapira, Ariel D. Procaccia, Aarti Singh\",\"doi\":\"10.1609/aaaiss.v3i1.31280\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Decision-making and reaching consensus are an integral part of everyday life, and studying how individuals reach these decisions is an important problem in psychology, economics, and social choice theory. Our work develops methods and theory for learning the nature of decisions reached upon by individual decision makers or groups of individuals using data. \\n\\nWe consider two tasks, where we have access to data on: 1) Cardinal utilities for d individuals with cardinal consensus values that the group or decision maker arrives at, 2) Cardinal utilities for d individuals for pairs of actions, with ordinal information about the consensus, i.e., which action is better according to the consensus. Under some axioms of social choice theory, the set of possible decision functions reduces to the set of weighted power means, M(u, w, p) = (∑ᵢ₌₁ᵈ wᵢ uᵢᵖ)¹ᐟᵖ, where uᵢ indicate the d utilities, w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} denotes the weights assigned to the d individuals, and p ∈ ℝ (Cousins 2023). For instance, p = 1 corresponds to a weighted utilitiarian function, and p = -∞ is the egalitarian welfare function. \\n\\nOur goal is to learn w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} and p ∈ ℝ for the two tasks given data. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
决策和达成共识是日常生活中不可或缺的一部分,而研究个人如何达成这些决策是心理学、经济学和社会选择理论中的一个重要问题。我们的工作开发了利用数据学习个体决策者或群体决策性质的方法和理论。我们考虑了两个任务,在这两个任务中,我们可以获得以下数据:1) d 个个体的基本效用,以及群体或决策者达成的基本共识值;2) d 个个体对行动的基本效用,以及关于共识的序数信息,即根据共识哪种行动更好。根据社会选择理论的一些公理,可能的决策函数集合可以简化为加权平均值集合,M(u, w, p) = (∑ᵢ₌₁ᵈ wᵢ uᵢᵖ)¹ᐟᵖ、其中,uᵢ 表示 d 个效用,w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} 表示分配给 d 个个体的权重,p ∈ ℝ (Cousins,2023 年)。例如,p = 1 对应于加权功利主义函数,而 p = -∞ 则是平等主义福利函数。我们的目标是针对给定数据的两项任务,学习 w∈ ∆_{d - 1} 和 p∈ ℝ。第一个任务类似于回归,我们将证明由于 w 和 p 的单调性(Qi 2000},在给定心效用和社会福利值的情况下学习这些参数是一个 PAC 可学习的任务。对于第二项任务,我们希望学习 w、p,以便在给定一对行动 u、v ∈ℝ₊ᵈ的情况下,偏好值为 C((u, v), w, p) = sign(ln(M(u, w, p)) - ln(M(v, w, p))。这类似于分类;但是,在 w 和 p 中损失函数的凸性得不到保证。我们分析了两种相关情况--一种是权重 w 已知,另一种是权重未知。通过给出已知权重情况下 VC 维度的 O(log d) 约束和未知权重情况下 VC 维度的 O(d log d) 约束,我们证明了这两种情况在给定正 u、v 时都是可 PAC 学习的。我们还建立了在 IID(Natarajan,2013 年)和逻辑噪声模型下该任务的高噪声数据的 PAC 可学习性。最后,我们通过对模拟数据的实验,展示了简单算法如何有助于学习 w 和 p,直至达到中等高度的 d。
Learning Decision-Making Functions Given Cardinal and Ordinal Consensus Data
Decision-making and reaching consensus are an integral part of everyday life, and studying how individuals reach these decisions is an important problem in psychology, economics, and social choice theory. Our work develops methods and theory for learning the nature of decisions reached upon by individual decision makers or groups of individuals using data.
We consider two tasks, where we have access to data on: 1) Cardinal utilities for d individuals with cardinal consensus values that the group or decision maker arrives at, 2) Cardinal utilities for d individuals for pairs of actions, with ordinal information about the consensus, i.e., which action is better according to the consensus. Under some axioms of social choice theory, the set of possible decision functions reduces to the set of weighted power means, M(u, w, p) = (∑ᵢ₌₁ᵈ wᵢ uᵢᵖ)¹ᐟᵖ, where uᵢ indicate the d utilities, w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} denotes the weights assigned to the d individuals, and p ∈ ℝ (Cousins 2023). For instance, p = 1 corresponds to a weighted utilitiarian function, and p = -∞ is the egalitarian welfare function.
Our goal is to learn w ∈ ∆_{d - 1} and p ∈ ℝ for the two tasks given data. The first task is analogous to regression, and we show that owing to the monotonicity in w and p (Qi 2000}, learning these parameters given cardinal utilities and social welfare values is a PAC-learnable task. For the second task, we wish to learn w, p such that, given pairs of actions u, v ∈ ℝ₊ᵈ, the preference is given as C((u, v), w, p) = sign(ln(M(u, w, p)) - ln(M(v, w, p))). This is analogous to classification; however, convexity of the loss function in w and p is not guaranteed.
We analyze two related cases - one in which the weights w are known, and another in which the weights are unknown. We prove that both cases are PAC-learnable given positive u, v by giving an O(log d) bound on the VC dimension for the known weights case, and an O(d log d) bound for the unknown weights case. We also establish PAC-learnability for noisy data under IID (Natarajan 2013) and logistic noise models for this task. Finally, we demonstrate how simple algorithms can be useful to learn w and p up to moderately high d through experiments on simulated data.