{"title":"显性偏好理论的幽灵","authors":"Lukas Beck","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5715","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"168 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Specter of Revealed Preference Theory\",\"authors\":\"Lukas Beck\",\"doi\":\"10.3998/ergo.5715\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them.\",\"PeriodicalId\":504477,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"168 5\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5715\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5715","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
My aim in this paper is to argue that the recent philosophical defenses of revealed preference theory do not withstand scrutiny. Towards this aim, I will first outline revealed preference theory. I will then briefly present the two most common arguments that the received view offers against it. Afterwards, I will outline three argumentative strategies for rehabilitating revealed preference theory, and successively rebut each of them.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
