在某些排序选票选举中,选票很容易被买走,该怎么办?

IF 4.7 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Jack R. Williams, Samuel Baltz, Charles Stewart
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的研究表明,在某些排序投票选举中,可能会出现违反不记名投票的情况。即使是对少数几个候选人进行排名,也有许多方法,因此许多可能的排名可能不会被任何选民投出。因此,买票人可以付钱给某人,让他按照某种方式给候选人排序,然后利用公布的选举结果来验证投票人是否按规定进行了排序。我们以即时决胜投票(IRV)为重点,从理论和实证两方面研究了这种攻击的可行性。虽然许多 IRV 选举的候选人数量很少,因此这种方案并不可行,但我们利用旧金山的数据和奥克兰的一项选举规则变更提案,说明一些重要的 IRV 选举可能会有大量未使用的排名。没有证据表明这种贿选方案被使用过。然而,它的存在对 IRV 选举的管理和安全产生了影响。當更多的候選人可以在選舉中排名,而選舉結果會報告所有候選人的排名方式時,這個方案就更加可行。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Votes Can Be Confidently Bought in Some Ranked Ballot Elections, and What to Do about It
We show that, in some ranked ballot elections, it may be possible to violate the secret vote. There are so many ways to rank even a handful of candidates that many possible rankings might not be cast by any voter. So, a vote buyer could pay someone to rank the candidates a certain way and then use the announced election results to verify that the voter followed through. We examine the feasibility of this attack both theoretically and empirically, focusing on instant runoff voting (IRV). Although many IRV elections have few enough candidates that this scheme is not feasible, we use data from San Francisco and a proposed election rule change in Oakland to show that some important IRV elections can have large numbers of unused rankings. There is no evidence that this vote-buying scheme has ever been used. However, its existence has implications for the administration and security of IRV elections. This scheme is more feasible when more candidates can be ranked in the election and when the election results report all the ways that candidates were ranked.
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来源期刊
Political Analysis
Political Analysis POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
8.80
自引率
3.70%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Political Analysis chronicles these exciting developments by publishing the most sophisticated scholarship in the field. It is the place to learn new methods, to find some of the best empirical scholarship, and to publish your best research.
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