监督强度、机构股东和盈利操纵引发的会计丑闻：南非视角

International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI:10.32479/ijefi.15298

Oloyede Obagbuwa, Farai Kwenda, Kiran Baldavoo

{"title":"监督强度、机构股东和盈利操纵引发的会计丑闻：南非视角","authors":"Oloyede Obagbuwa, Farai Kwenda, Kiran Baldavoo","doi":"10.32479/ijefi.15298","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study determines the extent to which loosening institutional shareholder monitoring intensity induces earnings management, thereby leading to accounting scandals. When there is intense monitoring of the corporate executives, their opportunistic tendencies are prevented, and corporate decisions align with the value-creation target. The study postulates that institutional shareholders' relaxed monitoring role positively and significantly impacts earnings management. The more robust Two-Step System GMM was used to analyse the collected data of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for 15 years from 2004 to 2019. The finding revealed that slack institutional shareholders' control affects earnings management positively.","PeriodicalId":30329,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues","volume":"31 17","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Monitoring Intensity, Institutional Shareholders, and Earnings Manipulation Engendered Accounting Scandal: The South African Perspective\",\"authors\":\"Oloyede Obagbuwa, Farai Kwenda, Kiran Baldavoo\",\"doi\":\"10.32479/ijefi.15298\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study determines the extent to which loosening institutional shareholder monitoring intensity induces earnings management, thereby leading to accounting scandals. When there is intense monitoring of the corporate executives, their opportunistic tendencies are prevented, and corporate decisions align with the value-creation target. The study postulates that institutional shareholders' relaxed monitoring role positively and significantly impacts earnings management. The more robust Two-Step System GMM was used to analyse the collected data of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for 15 years from 2004 to 2019. The finding revealed that slack institutional shareholders' control affects earnings management positively.\",\"PeriodicalId\":30329,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues\",\"volume\":\"31 17\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.32479/ijefi.15298\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.32479/ijefi.15298","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究确定了放松机构股东监督强度在多大程度上会诱发收益管理，从而导致会计丑闻。当对公司高管的监督强度较大时，他们的机会主义倾向就会被阻止，公司决策就会与价值创造目标保持一致。本研究推测，机构股东宽松的监督作用会对收益管理产生积极而显著的影响。研究采用了更稳健的两步系统 GMM 方法，对收集到的约翰内斯堡证券交易所（JSE）上市公司 2004 年至 2019 年 15 年的数据进行了分析。研究结果表明，机构股东宽松的控制会对收益管理产生积极影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Monitoring Intensity, Institutional Shareholders, and Earnings Manipulation Engendered Accounting Scandal: The South African Perspective

This study determines the extent to which loosening institutional shareholder monitoring intensity induces earnings management, thereby leading to accounting scandals. When there is intense monitoring of the corporate executives, their opportunistic tendencies are prevented, and corporate decisions align with the value-creation target. The study postulates that institutional shareholders' relaxed monitoring role positively and significantly impacts earnings management. The more robust Two-Step System GMM was used to analyse the collected data of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) for 15 years from 2004 to 2019. The finding revealed that slack institutional shareholders' control affects earnings management positively.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues (IJEFI) is the international academic journal, and is a double-blind, peer-reviewed academic journal publishing high quality conceptual and measure development articles in the areas of economics, finance and related disciplines. The journal has a worldwide audience. The journal''s goal is to stimulate the development of economics, finance and related disciplines theory worldwide by publishing interesting articles in a highly readable format. The journal is published Bimonthly (6 issues per year) and covers a wide variety of topics including (but not limited to): Macroeconomcis International Economics Econometrics Business Economics Growth and Development Regional Economics Tourism Economics International Trade Finance International Finance Macroeconomic Aspects of Finance General Financial Markets Financial Institutions Behavioral Finance Public Finance Asset Pricing Financial Management Options and Futures Taxation, Subsidies and Revenue Corporate Finance and Governance Money and Banking Markets and Institutions of Emerging Markets Public Economics and Public Policy Financial Economics Applied Financial Econometrics Financial Risk Analysis Risk Management Portfolio Management Financial Econometrics.