{"title":"股价暴跌风险对银行派息的影响","authors":"Justin Yiqiang Jin, Yi Liu","doi":"10.3390/jrfm17050209","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we examine whether and how banks employ dividend payout policies in response to the risk of stock price crashes. Using a sample of U.S. banks, we find that banks increase their dividend payouts when faced with a higher risk of stock price crashes. In addition, we find that well-capitalized banks tend to pay more dividends when the risk of a stock price crash is elevated. This aligns with the regulatory pressure theory that banks distribute dividends when they have sufficient capital that meets or exceeds the regulatory standards. This is also in line with the signaling theory that dividend payments reflect a bank’s confidence in its financial health. Furthermore, we find that financially opaque banks tend to make more dividend payments when they are at a higher risk of stock price crashes. This supports the agency cost theory, suggesting that dividends counterbalance the need to monitor bank managers in less transparent reporting environments.","PeriodicalId":508146,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Risk and Financial Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impact of Stock Price Crash Risk on Bank Dividend Payouts\",\"authors\":\"Justin Yiqiang Jin, Yi Liu\",\"doi\":\"10.3390/jrfm17050209\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this study, we examine whether and how banks employ dividend payout policies in response to the risk of stock price crashes. Using a sample of U.S. banks, we find that banks increase their dividend payouts when faced with a higher risk of stock price crashes. In addition, we find that well-capitalized banks tend to pay more dividends when the risk of a stock price crash is elevated. This aligns with the regulatory pressure theory that banks distribute dividends when they have sufficient capital that meets or exceeds the regulatory standards. This is also in line with the signaling theory that dividend payments reflect a bank’s confidence in its financial health. Furthermore, we find that financially opaque banks tend to make more dividend payments when they are at a higher risk of stock price crashes. This supports the agency cost theory, suggesting that dividends counterbalance the need to monitor bank managers in less transparent reporting environments.\",\"PeriodicalId\":508146,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Risk and Financial Management\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Risk and Financial Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17050209\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Risk and Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17050209","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Impact of Stock Price Crash Risk on Bank Dividend Payouts
In this study, we examine whether and how banks employ dividend payout policies in response to the risk of stock price crashes. Using a sample of U.S. banks, we find that banks increase their dividend payouts when faced with a higher risk of stock price crashes. In addition, we find that well-capitalized banks tend to pay more dividends when the risk of a stock price crash is elevated. This aligns with the regulatory pressure theory that banks distribute dividends when they have sufficient capital that meets or exceeds the regulatory standards. This is also in line with the signaling theory that dividend payments reflect a bank’s confidence in its financial health. Furthermore, we find that financially opaque banks tend to make more dividend payments when they are at a higher risk of stock price crashes. This supports the agency cost theory, suggesting that dividends counterbalance the need to monitor bank managers in less transparent reporting environments.