股价暴跌风险对银行派息的影响

Justin Yiqiang Jin, Yi Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中,我们探讨了银行是否以及如何采用股利支付政策来应对股价暴跌的风险。通过对美国银行的抽样调查,我们发现,当面临股价暴跌的风险较高时,银行会增加股息支付。此外,我们还发现,当股价暴跌风险升高时,资本充足的银行倾向于支付更多股息。这与监管压力理论是一致的,即当银行有足够的资本达到或超过监管标准时,银行就会分配股利。这也符合信号理论,即股息支付反映了银行对其财务健康状况的信心。此外,我们还发现,财务不透明的银行往往会在股价暴跌风险较高时支付更多股利。这支持了代理成本理论,表明在报告透明度较低的环境下,股息可以抵消对银行经理的监督需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of Stock Price Crash Risk on Bank Dividend Payouts
In this study, we examine whether and how banks employ dividend payout policies in response to the risk of stock price crashes. Using a sample of U.S. banks, we find that banks increase their dividend payouts when faced with a higher risk of stock price crashes. In addition, we find that well-capitalized banks tend to pay more dividends when the risk of a stock price crash is elevated. This aligns with the regulatory pressure theory that banks distribute dividends when they have sufficient capital that meets or exceeds the regulatory standards. This is also in line with the signaling theory that dividend payments reflect a bank’s confidence in its financial health. Furthermore, we find that financially opaque banks tend to make more dividend payments when they are at a higher risk of stock price crashes. This supports the agency cost theory, suggesting that dividends counterbalance the need to monitor bank managers in less transparent reporting environments.
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