双重控股与股东-债权人代理冲突：银团贷款市场的证据

IF 2.2 3区管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Pub Date : 2024-05-13 DOI:10.1111/jbfa.12805

Ingo Geburtig, Thomas Mählmann, Roberto Liebscher

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了私募股权（PE）公司向抵押贷款义务（CLO）（即杠杆贷款）业务扩张所带来的影响。由于 CLO 管理者和 PE 公司的投资领域相似，经营这两种公司的资产管理者经常持有同一家公司的债权和股权。我们的研究结果表明，通过缓解股东与债权人之间的代理冲突，这些公司的信贷成本降低了。融资成本的降低意味着私募股权投资公司的股权收益增加。此外，我们的研究结果表明，与 PE 有关联的 CLO 管理者可以从二级杠杆贷款市场的知情交易中获益。

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Dual holdings and shareholder–creditor agency conflicts: Evidence from the syndicated loan market

We examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE‐affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.

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来源期刊

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.40

自引率

17.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.