智能新能源汽车产业跨界合作研发的演化博弈分析

IF 2.5 4区 计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS
Kybernetes Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI:10.1108/k-11-2023-2279
Jinhuan Tang, Qiong Wu, Kun Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目的智能新能源汽车(INEV)正在成为汽车行业的竞争热点。本研究的主要目的是确定如何通过新能源汽车(NEV)企业与科技企业之间的知识共享和技术溢出来提高创新效率。这将有助于提高中国汽车产业的核心竞争力。作者构建了一个三方演化博弈模型来研究跨界合作创新问题。首先,建立了新能源汽车企业、科技企业和政府的支付矩阵,并确定了各参与方的预期收益。然后,分析了复制动态方程和演化稳定策略。最后,通过数值模拟对理论研究进行了验证:(1) 跨境合作中存在最优的收入分配系数范围。(2) 研究与开发(R&D)成功率、补贴、资源与技术互补性、载体智能等因素对合作战略的演化有积极影响。(3) 技术溢出风险成本等因素会抑制合作战略的演进。具体而言,当技术溢出风险成本大于 2.5 时,两家企业倾向于选择自主研发,政府选择提供补贴。研究结果表明,政府可以根据汽车产业的研发能力和资源配置优化补贴政策。此外,还需采取措施降低技术外溢风险,鼓励企业合作创新。原创性/价值INEV产业已成为全球汽车产业的重要发展方向。然而,有关 INEV 产业跨国合作的研究却十分有限。因此,作者构建了一个由新能源汽车企业、技术企业和政府共同参与的三方演化博弈模型,探讨了 INEV 产业参与者之间的合作与竞争关系,为 INEV 产业的发展提供了一个新的视角。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evolutionary game analysis on cross-border cooperative R&D of intelligent new energy vehicle industry

Purpose

Intelligent new energy vehicles (INEVs) are becoming the competitive hotspot for the automobile industry. The major purpose of this study is to determine how to increase innovation efficiency through knowledge sharing and technology spill between new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises and technology enterprises. This will help to improve the core competence of the automobile industry in China. Also, it serves as a guide for the growth of other strategic.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the cross-border cooperative innovation problem. Firstly, the payment matrix of NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and government is established, and the expected revenue of each participant is determined. Then, the replication dynamic equations and evolutionary stability strategies are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation.

Findings

Results showed that: (1) An optimal range of revenue distribution coefficient exists in the cross-border cooperation. (2) Factors like research and development (R&D) success rate, subsidies, resource and technology complementarity, and vehicles intelligence positively influence the evolution towards cooperative strategies. (3) Factors like technology spillover risk cost inhibit the evolution towards cooperative strategies. To be specific, when the technology spillover risk cost is greater than 2.5, two enterprises are inclined to choose independent R&D, and the government chooses to provide subsidy.

Research limitations/implications

The research perspective and theoretical analysis are helpful to further explore the cross-border cooperation of the intelligent automobile industry. The findings suggest that the government can optimize the subsidy policy according to the R&D capability and resource allocation of automobile industry. Moreover, measures are needed to reduce the risk of technology spillovers to encourage enterprise to collaborate and innovate. The results can provide reference for enterprises’ strategic choice and government’s policy making.

Originality/value

The INEV industry has become an important development direction of the global automobile industry. However, there is limited research on cross-border cooperation of INEV industry. Hence, authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and the government, and explore the relationship of cooperation and competition among players in the INEV industry, which provides a new perspective for the development of the INEV industry.

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来源期刊
Kybernetes
Kybernetes 工程技术-计算机:控制论
CiteScore
4.90
自引率
16.00%
发文量
237
审稿时长
4.3 months
期刊介绍: Kybernetes is the official journal of the UNESCO recognized World Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics (WOSC), and The Cybernetics Society. The journal is an important forum for the exchange of knowledge and information among all those who are interested in cybernetics and systems thinking. It is devoted to improvement in the understanding of human, social, organizational, technological and sustainable aspects of society and their interdependencies. It encourages consideration of a range of theories, methodologies and approaches, and their transdisciplinary links. The spirit of the journal comes from Norbert Wiener''s understanding of cybernetics as "The Human Use of Human Beings." Hence, Kybernetes strives for examination and analysis, based on a systemic frame of reference, of burning issues of ecosystems, society, organizations, businesses and human behavior.
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