{"title":"不对称生产努力信息下考虑产出风险的分布式光伏项目采购合同设计","authors":"Lian Bai, Dong Cai","doi":"10.1108/k-01-2024-0156","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Purpose</h3>\n<p>Distributed photovoltaic (DPV) projects generally have output risks, and the production effort of the supplier is often private information, so the buyer needs to design the optimal procurement contract to maximise its procurement utility.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>Based on the principal-agent theory, we design optimal procurement contracts for DPV projects with fixed payments and incentive factors under three situations, i.e. symmetry information, asymmetry information without monitoring and asymmetry information with monitoring. We obtain the optimal production effort and expected utility of the supplier, the expected output and expected utility of the buyer and analyse the value of the information and monitoring.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>The results show that under asymmetric information without monitoring, risk-averse suppliers need to take some risk due to output risk, which reduces the optimal production effort of the supplier and the expected output and expected utility of the buyer. Therefore, when the monitoring cost is below a certain threshold value, the buyer can introduce a procurement contract with monitoring to address the asymmetry information. In addition, under asymmetric information without monitoring, the buyer should choose a supplier with a low-risk aversion.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>Considering the output risk of DPV projects, we study the optimal procurement contract design for the buyer under asymmetric information. The results provide some theoretical basis and management insights for the buyer to design optimal procurement contracts in different situations.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->","PeriodicalId":49930,"journal":{"name":"Kybernetes","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Procurement contract design for distributed photovoltaic project considering output risk under asymmetric production effort information\",\"authors\":\"Lian Bai, Dong Cai\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/k-01-2024-0156\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<h3>Purpose</h3>\\n<p>Distributed photovoltaic (DPV) projects generally have output risks, and the production effort of the supplier is often private information, so the buyer needs to design the optimal procurement contract to maximise its procurement utility.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\\n<p>Based on the principal-agent theory, we design optimal procurement contracts for DPV projects with fixed payments and incentive factors under three situations, i.e. symmetry information, asymmetry information without monitoring and asymmetry information with monitoring. We obtain the optimal production effort and expected utility of the supplier, the expected output and expected utility of the buyer and analyse the value of the information and monitoring.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Findings</h3>\\n<p>The results show that under asymmetric information without monitoring, risk-averse suppliers need to take some risk due to output risk, which reduces the optimal production effort of the supplier and the expected output and expected utility of the buyer. Therefore, when the monitoring cost is below a certain threshold value, the buyer can introduce a procurement contract with monitoring to address the asymmetry information. In addition, under asymmetric information without monitoring, the buyer should choose a supplier with a low-risk aversion.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\\n<p>Considering the output risk of DPV projects, we study the optimal procurement contract design for the buyer under asymmetric information. The results provide some theoretical basis and management insights for the buyer to design optimal procurement contracts in different situations.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\",\"PeriodicalId\":49930,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kybernetes\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kybernetes\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/k-01-2024-0156\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kybernetes","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/k-01-2024-0156","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Procurement contract design for distributed photovoltaic project considering output risk under asymmetric production effort information
Purpose
Distributed photovoltaic (DPV) projects generally have output risks, and the production effort of the supplier is often private information, so the buyer needs to design the optimal procurement contract to maximise its procurement utility.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the principal-agent theory, we design optimal procurement contracts for DPV projects with fixed payments and incentive factors under three situations, i.e. symmetry information, asymmetry information without monitoring and asymmetry information with monitoring. We obtain the optimal production effort and expected utility of the supplier, the expected output and expected utility of the buyer and analyse the value of the information and monitoring.
Findings
The results show that under asymmetric information without monitoring, risk-averse suppliers need to take some risk due to output risk, which reduces the optimal production effort of the supplier and the expected output and expected utility of the buyer. Therefore, when the monitoring cost is below a certain threshold value, the buyer can introduce a procurement contract with monitoring to address the asymmetry information. In addition, under asymmetric information without monitoring, the buyer should choose a supplier with a low-risk aversion.
Originality/value
Considering the output risk of DPV projects, we study the optimal procurement contract design for the buyer under asymmetric information. The results provide some theoretical basis and management insights for the buyer to design optimal procurement contracts in different situations.
期刊介绍:
Kybernetes is the official journal of the UNESCO recognized World Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics (WOSC), and The Cybernetics Society.
The journal is an important forum for the exchange of knowledge and information among all those who are interested in cybernetics and systems thinking.
It is devoted to improvement in the understanding of human, social, organizational, technological and sustainable aspects of society and their interdependencies. It encourages consideration of a range of theories, methodologies and approaches, and their transdisciplinary links. The spirit of the journal comes from Norbert Wiener''s understanding of cybernetics as "The Human Use of Human Beings." Hence, Kybernetes strives for examination and analysis, based on a systemic frame of reference, of burning issues of ecosystems, society, organizations, businesses and human behavior.