中国总量控制与交易机制下供应链的碳排放配额购买决策：演化博弈分析

IF 2.5 4区计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS

Kybernetes Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI:10.1108/k-02-2024-0457

Haiju Hu, Yakun Li

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引用次数: 0

摘要

目的碳减排的重要性已成为全球共识，越来越多的国家开始实施限额交易机制，中国也不例外。本文旨在研究中国限额交易机制下供应链成员的最优碳排放配额（CEA）购买决策。设计/方法/途径建立演化博弈模型，分析供应链中供应商和制造商的碳排放配额购买策略选择。通过数值模拟分析了关键参数对演化博弈结果的影响。研究结果供应链系统总是朝着供应商和制造商都不购买 CEA 或都购买 CEA 的方向演化。非法生产行为和过高的 CEA 成本是阻碍双方购买 CEA 的关键因素。原创性/价值该结果有助于供应链成员做出更好的 CEA 购买决策，也有利于中国碳交易市场的发展和环境保护。

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Carbon emission allowances purchasing decisions in supply chains under the cap-and-trade mechanism in China: an evolutionary game analysis

Purpose

The importance of carbon reduction has become a global consensus, and more and more countries are implementing the cap-and-trade mechanism, including China. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal carbon emission allowances (CEA) purchasing decisions of supply chain members under the cap-and-trade mechanism in China.

Design/methodology/approach

An evolutionary game model is established to analyze the CEA purchase strategy choices of suppliers and manufacturers in the supply chain. The influence of the key parameters on the evolutionary game results is analyzed by numerical simulations.

Findings

The supply chain system always evolves towards neither supplier nor manufacturer purchasing CEA or both purchasing CEA. Illegal production behavior and excessive CEA costs are key factors that hinder parties from purchasing CEA. High revenue from purchasing CEA for production, high supply chain losses and high governmental penalties can promote parties to purchase CEA.

Originality/value

The results help supply chain members make better CEA purchasing decisions and also benefit the development of China’s carbon trading market and environmental protection.

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来源期刊

Kybernetes 工程技术-计算机：控制论

CiteScore

4.90

自引率

16.00%

发文量

237

审稿时长

4.3 months

期刊介绍： Kybernetes is the official journal of the UNESCO recognized World Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics (WOSC), and The Cybernetics Society. The journal is an important forum for the exchange of knowledge and information among all those who are interested in cybernetics and systems thinking. It is devoted to improvement in the understanding of human, social, organizational, technological and sustainable aspects of society and their interdependencies. It encourages consideration of a range of theories, methodologies and approaches, and their transdisciplinary links. The spirit of the journal comes from Norbert Wiener''s understanding of cybernetics as "The Human Use of Human Beings." Hence, Kybernetes strives for examination and analysis, based on a systemic frame of reference, of burning issues of ecosystems, society, organizations, businesses and human behavior.