{"title":"十九世纪英国的犯罪意图","authors":"Philip Handler","doi":"10.1017/s0008197324000217","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article examines how intention became key to criminal responsibility in nineteenth-century England. It focuses on trials where judges wrested with defence counsel and juries for control over its determination. The most important rule that developed to support proof of intention was the presumption that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The article charts the origins and functions of the presumption to offer a revised view of the nineteenth-century foundations of the modern law of criminal intention.","PeriodicalId":501295,"journal":{"name":"The Cambridge Law Journal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CRIMINAL INTENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND\",\"authors\":\"Philip Handler\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/s0008197324000217\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article examines how intention became key to criminal responsibility in nineteenth-century England. It focuses on trials where judges wrested with defence counsel and juries for control over its determination. The most important rule that developed to support proof of intention was the presumption that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The article charts the origins and functions of the presumption to offer a revised view of the nineteenth-century foundations of the modern law of criminal intention.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501295,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Cambridge Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Cambridge Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008197324000217\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Cambridge Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008197324000217","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines how intention became key to criminal responsibility in nineteenth-century England. It focuses on trials where judges wrested with defence counsel and juries for control over its determination. The most important rule that developed to support proof of intention was the presumption that a person intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions. The article charts the origins and functions of the presumption to offer a revised view of the nineteenth-century foundations of the modern law of criminal intention.