{"title":"在平台供应链中战略性地引入陈列室渠道:如何在成本效率低下与信息不对称之间取得平衡","authors":"Mengli Li, Shuguang Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10660-024-09826-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>To cope with the challenge caused by the lack of physical evaluation, many e-commerce platforms introduce a showroom channel, in which consumers can feel and touch products before purchasing. Based on this background, we consider there are two strategies of an e-commerce platform to introduce a showroom channel, i.e., self-build strategy and cooperation strategy. Then we build theoretical models by characterising cost inefficiency of self-build strategy and information asymmetry of cooperation strategy in the platform supply chain. Next, we derive the optimal decisions under different strategies, and investigate the advantage of different strategies. Last, we explore the strategic introduction of the showroom channel in the platform supply chain. We find the following results. (1) Under cooperation strategy, the platform can strategically design two different cooperation contracts to the retailer, i.e., full incentive contract and partial incentive contract. Moreover, the retailer may be hurt by a higher demand due to information asymmetry under cooperation strategy. (2) Self-build strategy generates information advantage and cooperation strategy brings channel advantage, which jointly affect the optimal showroom channel strategy of the platform. To be more specific, when high-type demand of the retailer is relatively high and reservation profit of the retailer is relatively low, channel advantage dominates information advantage, then the platform will choose cooperation strategy. (3) Under some conditions, the optimal strategy of the platform is not in line with the optimal ones of the whole supply chain. Then we design a side payment contract to achieve Pareto improvement.</p>","PeriodicalId":47264,"journal":{"name":"Electronic Commerce Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic introduction of the showroom channel in a platform supply chain: how to balance cost inefficiency against information asymmetry\",\"authors\":\"Mengli Li, Shuguang Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10660-024-09826-5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>To cope with the challenge caused by the lack of physical evaluation, many e-commerce platforms introduce a showroom channel, in which consumers can feel and touch products before purchasing. Based on this background, we consider there are two strategies of an e-commerce platform to introduce a showroom channel, i.e., self-build strategy and cooperation strategy. Then we build theoretical models by characterising cost inefficiency of self-build strategy and information asymmetry of cooperation strategy in the platform supply chain. Next, we derive the optimal decisions under different strategies, and investigate the advantage of different strategies. Last, we explore the strategic introduction of the showroom channel in the platform supply chain. We find the following results. (1) Under cooperation strategy, the platform can strategically design two different cooperation contracts to the retailer, i.e., full incentive contract and partial incentive contract. Moreover, the retailer may be hurt by a higher demand due to information asymmetry under cooperation strategy. (2) Self-build strategy generates information advantage and cooperation strategy brings channel advantage, which jointly affect the optimal showroom channel strategy of the platform. To be more specific, when high-type demand of the retailer is relatively high and reservation profit of the retailer is relatively low, channel advantage dominates information advantage, then the platform will choose cooperation strategy. (3) Under some conditions, the optimal strategy of the platform is not in line with the optimal ones of the whole supply chain. Then we design a side payment contract to achieve Pareto improvement.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47264,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Electronic Commerce Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Electronic Commerce Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-024-09826-5\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electronic Commerce Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-024-09826-5","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic introduction of the showroom channel in a platform supply chain: how to balance cost inefficiency against information asymmetry
To cope with the challenge caused by the lack of physical evaluation, many e-commerce platforms introduce a showroom channel, in which consumers can feel and touch products before purchasing. Based on this background, we consider there are two strategies of an e-commerce platform to introduce a showroom channel, i.e., self-build strategy and cooperation strategy. Then we build theoretical models by characterising cost inefficiency of self-build strategy and information asymmetry of cooperation strategy in the platform supply chain. Next, we derive the optimal decisions under different strategies, and investigate the advantage of different strategies. Last, we explore the strategic introduction of the showroom channel in the platform supply chain. We find the following results. (1) Under cooperation strategy, the platform can strategically design two different cooperation contracts to the retailer, i.e., full incentive contract and partial incentive contract. Moreover, the retailer may be hurt by a higher demand due to information asymmetry under cooperation strategy. (2) Self-build strategy generates information advantage and cooperation strategy brings channel advantage, which jointly affect the optimal showroom channel strategy of the platform. To be more specific, when high-type demand of the retailer is relatively high and reservation profit of the retailer is relatively low, channel advantage dominates information advantage, then the platform will choose cooperation strategy. (3) Under some conditions, the optimal strategy of the platform is not in line with the optimal ones of the whole supply chain. Then we design a side payment contract to achieve Pareto improvement.
期刊介绍:
The Internet and the World Wide Web have brought a fundamental change in the way that individuals access data, information and services. Individuals have access to vast amounts of data, to experts and services that are not limited in time or space. This has forced business to change the way in which they conduct their commercial transactions with their end customers and with other businesses, resulting in the development of a global market through the Internet. The emergence of the Internet and electronic commerce raises many new research issues. The Electronic Commerce Research journal will serve as a forum for stimulating and disseminating research into all facets of electronic commerce - from research into core enabling technologies to work on assessing and understanding the implications of these technologies on societies, economies, businesses and individuals. The journal concentrates on theoretical as well as empirical research that leads to better understanding of electronic commerce and its implications. Topics covered by the journal include, but are not restricted to the following subjects as they relate to the Internet and electronic commerce: Dissemination of services through the Internet;Intelligent agents technologies and their impact;The global impact of electronic commerce;The economics of electronic commerce;Fraud reduction on the Internet;Mobile electronic commerce;Virtual electronic commerce systems;Application of computer and communication technologies to electronic commerce;Electronic market mechanisms and their impact;Auctioning over the Internet;Business models of Internet based companies;Service creation and provisioning;The job market created by the Internet and electronic commerce;Security, privacy, authorization and authentication of users and transactions on the Internet;Electronic data interc hange over the Internet;Electronic payment systems and electronic funds transfer;The impact of electronic commerce on organizational structures and processes;Supply chain management through the Internet;Marketing on the Internet;User adaptive advertisement;Standards in electronic commerce and their analysis;Metrics, measurement and prediction of user activity;On-line stock markets and financial trading;User devices for accessing the Internet and conducting electronic transactions;Efficient search techniques and engines on the WWW;Web based languages (e.g., HTML, XML, VRML, Java);Multimedia storage and distribution;Internet;Collaborative learning, gaming and work;Presentation page design techniques and tools;Virtual reality on the net and 3D visualization;Browsers and user interfaces;Web site management techniques and tools;Managing middleware to support electronic commerce;Web based education, and training;Electronic journals and publishing on the Internet;Legal issues, taxation and property rights;Modeling and design of networks to support Internet applications;Modeling, design and sizing of web site servers;Reliability of intensive on-line applications;Pervasive devices and pervasive computing in electronic commerce;Workflow for electronic commerce applications;Coordination technologies for electronic commerce;Personalization and mass customization technologies;Marketing and customer relationship management in electronic commerce;Service creation and provisioning. Audience: Academics and professionals involved in electronic commerce research and the application and use of the Internet. Managers, consultants, decision-makers and developers who value the use of electronic com merce research results. Special Issues: Electronic Commerce Research publishes from time to time a special issue of the devoted to a single subject area. If interested in serving as a guest editor for a special issue, please contact the Editor-in-Chief J. Christopher Westland at westland@uic.edu with a proposal for the special issue. Officially cited as: Electron Commer Res