在平台供应链中战略性地引入陈列室渠道:如何在成本效率低下与信息不对称之间取得平衡

IF 3.7 4区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS
Mengli Li, Shuguang Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了应对缺乏实物评估所带来的挑战,许多电商平台引入了展厅渠道,让消费者在购买前可以感受和触摸产品。基于这一背景,我们认为电商平台引入展厅渠道有两种策略,即自建策略和合作策略。然后,我们通过描述平台供应链中自建策略的成本效率低下和合作策略的信息不对称来建立理论模型。接着,我们推导出不同战略下的最优决策,并研究不同战略的优势。最后,我们探讨了在平台供应链中引入展厅渠道的策略。我们发现了以下结果。(1)在合作策略下,平台可以战略性地为零售商设计两种不同的合作合约,即完全激励合约和部分激励合约。此外,在合作战略下,由于信息不对称,零售商可能会受到更高的需求伤害。(2)自建策略产生信息优势,合作策略带来渠道优势,二者共同影响平台的最优展厅渠道策略。具体来说,当零售商的高类型需求相对较高,而零售商的保留利润相对较低时,渠道优势会主导信息优势,此时平台会选择合作策略。(3)在某些条件下,平台的最优策略与整个供应链的最优策略不一致。那么,我们就设计一个侧付款合约来实现帕累托改进。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Strategic introduction of the showroom channel in a platform supply chain: how to balance cost inefficiency against information asymmetry

Strategic introduction of the showroom channel in a platform supply chain: how to balance cost inefficiency against information asymmetry

To cope with the challenge caused by the lack of physical evaluation, many e-commerce platforms introduce a showroom channel, in which consumers can feel and touch products before purchasing. Based on this background, we consider there are two strategies of an e-commerce platform to introduce a showroom channel, i.e., self-build strategy and cooperation strategy. Then we build theoretical models by characterising cost inefficiency of self-build strategy and information asymmetry of cooperation strategy in the platform supply chain. Next, we derive the optimal decisions under different strategies, and investigate the advantage of different strategies. Last, we explore the strategic introduction of the showroom channel in the platform supply chain. We find the following results. (1) Under cooperation strategy, the platform can strategically design two different cooperation contracts to the retailer, i.e., full incentive contract and partial incentive contract. Moreover, the retailer may be hurt by a higher demand due to information asymmetry under cooperation strategy. (2) Self-build strategy generates information advantage and cooperation strategy brings channel advantage, which jointly affect the optimal showroom channel strategy of the platform. To be more specific, when high-type demand of the retailer is relatively high and reservation profit of the retailer is relatively low, channel advantage dominates information advantage, then the platform will choose cooperation strategy. (3) Under some conditions, the optimal strategy of the platform is not in line with the optimal ones of the whole supply chain. Then we design a side payment contract to achieve Pareto improvement.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
12.80%
发文量
99
期刊介绍: The Internet and the World Wide Web have brought a fundamental change in the way that individuals access data, information and services. Individuals have access to vast amounts of data, to experts and services that are not limited in time or space. This has forced business to change the way in which they conduct their commercial transactions with their end customers and with other businesses, resulting in the development of a global market through the Internet. The emergence of the Internet and electronic commerce raises many new research issues. The Electronic Commerce Research journal will serve as a forum for stimulating and disseminating research into all facets of electronic commerce - from research into core enabling technologies to work on assessing and understanding the implications of these technologies on societies, economies, businesses and individuals. The journal concentrates on theoretical as well as empirical research that leads to better understanding of electronic commerce and its implications. Topics covered by the journal include, but are not restricted to the following subjects as they relate to the Internet and electronic commerce: Dissemination of services through the Internet;Intelligent agents technologies and their impact;The global impact of electronic commerce;The economics of electronic commerce;Fraud reduction on the Internet;Mobile electronic commerce;Virtual electronic commerce systems;Application of computer and communication technologies to electronic commerce;Electronic market mechanisms and their impact;Auctioning over the Internet;Business models of Internet based companies;Service creation and provisioning;The job market created by the Internet and electronic commerce;Security, privacy, authorization and authentication of users and transactions on the Internet;Electronic data interc hange over the Internet;Electronic payment systems and electronic funds transfer;The impact of electronic commerce on organizational structures and processes;Supply chain management through the Internet;Marketing on the Internet;User adaptive advertisement;Standards in electronic commerce and their analysis;Metrics, measurement and prediction of user activity;On-line stock markets and financial trading;User devices for accessing the Internet and conducting electronic transactions;Efficient search techniques and engines on the WWW;Web based languages (e.g., HTML, XML, VRML, Java);Multimedia storage and distribution;Internet;Collaborative learning, gaming and work;Presentation page design techniques and tools;Virtual reality on the net and 3D visualization;Browsers and user interfaces;Web site management techniques and tools;Managing middleware to support electronic commerce;Web based education, and training;Electronic journals and publishing on the Internet;Legal issues, taxation and property rights;Modeling and design of networks to support Internet applications;Modeling, design and sizing of web site servers;Reliability of intensive on-line applications;Pervasive devices and pervasive computing in electronic commerce;Workflow for electronic commerce applications;Coordination technologies for electronic commerce;Personalization and mass customization technologies;Marketing and customer relationship management in electronic commerce;Service creation and provisioning. Audience: Academics and professionals involved in electronic commerce research and the application and use of the Internet. Managers, consultants, decision-makers and developers who value the use of electronic com merce research results. Special Issues: Electronic Commerce Research publishes from time to time a special issue of the devoted to a single subject area. If interested in serving as a guest editor for a special issue, please contact the Editor-in-Chief J. Christopher Westland at westland@uic.edu with a proposal for the special issue. Officially cited as: Electron Commer Res
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