{"title":"好战的法治和不太坏的法律","authors":"András Sajó","doi":"10.1007/s40803-024-00221-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article provides intellectual arguments and tools from legal dogmatics that can help to counter the rule of law backlash. It argues that resilience can be boosted by a systemic militant rule of law approach. When it comes to restoring the rule of law, legal theory turns to the Radbruch formula (supra-statutory law). This approach remains contested by lawyers who are convinced – following the tradition of positivist legal theory – that invoking this formula is unacceptable because it violates a fundamental requirement of the rule of law, namely that of legality. Irrespective of the value of this concern, Radbruch’s formula is not applicable to the current demise of the rule of law, as the law resulting from cheating and abuse in illiberal regimes does not result in evil law (though it may facilitate such developments). Instead of evil law, we face not-so-bad law. Legal imperfections exist in every legal system, and militant rule of law necessitates the systemic revision of these shortcomings in order to preempt the abuses of an anti-formalistic populist regime. In illiberal regimes, the self-corrective mechanisms of the rule of law are gradually eliminated, but the name of the game remains the rule of law. It means that judges still have (some) power to counter the backlash using extant interpretive techniques (for a while). This article will begin by introducing the concept of not-so-bad (NSB) law as an imperfection of the rule of law. In Part Two, the validity of NSB laws is discussed by relying on the source theory. It argues that even if validity is a matter of conformity to the source, the source can be understood to contain a legal merit component as determined by the rule of law, and falling short on this legal merit component can constitute a ground for declaring the norm’s invalid. Part Three describes the abuses of the rule of law in illiberal democracies and describes how the NSB law of illiberal regimes does not satisfy the validity requirements of legal positivism. Part Four discusses the opportunities open to judges for resisting or undoing NSB law using existing techniques of legal interpretation and without violating rule of law principles.</p>","PeriodicalId":45733,"journal":{"name":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Militant Rule of Law and Not-so-Bad Law\",\"authors\":\"András Sajó\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s40803-024-00221-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The article provides intellectual arguments and tools from legal dogmatics that can help to counter the rule of law backlash. It argues that resilience can be boosted by a systemic militant rule of law approach. When it comes to restoring the rule of law, legal theory turns to the Radbruch formula (supra-statutory law). This approach remains contested by lawyers who are convinced – following the tradition of positivist legal theory – that invoking this formula is unacceptable because it violates a fundamental requirement of the rule of law, namely that of legality. Irrespective of the value of this concern, Radbruch’s formula is not applicable to the current demise of the rule of law, as the law resulting from cheating and abuse in illiberal regimes does not result in evil law (though it may facilitate such developments). Instead of evil law, we face not-so-bad law. Legal imperfections exist in every legal system, and militant rule of law necessitates the systemic revision of these shortcomings in order to preempt the abuses of an anti-formalistic populist regime. In illiberal regimes, the self-corrective mechanisms of the rule of law are gradually eliminated, but the name of the game remains the rule of law. It means that judges still have (some) power to counter the backlash using extant interpretive techniques (for a while). This article will begin by introducing the concept of not-so-bad (NSB) law as an imperfection of the rule of law. In Part Two, the validity of NSB laws is discussed by relying on the source theory. It argues that even if validity is a matter of conformity to the source, the source can be understood to contain a legal merit component as determined by the rule of law, and falling short on this legal merit component can constitute a ground for declaring the norm’s invalid. Part Three describes the abuses of the rule of law in illiberal democracies and describes how the NSB law of illiberal regimes does not satisfy the validity requirements of legal positivism. Part Four discusses the opportunities open to judges for resisting or undoing NSB law using existing techniques of legal interpretation and without violating rule of law principles.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45733,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law\",\"volume\":\"65 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00221-8\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00221-8","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
The article provides intellectual arguments and tools from legal dogmatics that can help to counter the rule of law backlash. It argues that resilience can be boosted by a systemic militant rule of law approach. When it comes to restoring the rule of law, legal theory turns to the Radbruch formula (supra-statutory law). This approach remains contested by lawyers who are convinced – following the tradition of positivist legal theory – that invoking this formula is unacceptable because it violates a fundamental requirement of the rule of law, namely that of legality. Irrespective of the value of this concern, Radbruch’s formula is not applicable to the current demise of the rule of law, as the law resulting from cheating and abuse in illiberal regimes does not result in evil law (though it may facilitate such developments). Instead of evil law, we face not-so-bad law. Legal imperfections exist in every legal system, and militant rule of law necessitates the systemic revision of these shortcomings in order to preempt the abuses of an anti-formalistic populist regime. In illiberal regimes, the self-corrective mechanisms of the rule of law are gradually eliminated, but the name of the game remains the rule of law. It means that judges still have (some) power to counter the backlash using extant interpretive techniques (for a while). This article will begin by introducing the concept of not-so-bad (NSB) law as an imperfection of the rule of law. In Part Two, the validity of NSB laws is discussed by relying on the source theory. It argues that even if validity is a matter of conformity to the source, the source can be understood to contain a legal merit component as determined by the rule of law, and falling short on this legal merit component can constitute a ground for declaring the norm’s invalid. Part Three describes the abuses of the rule of law in illiberal democracies and describes how the NSB law of illiberal regimes does not satisfy the validity requirements of legal positivism. Part Four discusses the opportunities open to judges for resisting or undoing NSB law using existing techniques of legal interpretation and without violating rule of law principles.
期刊介绍:
The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (HJRL) is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to deepen and broaden our knowledge and understanding about the rule of law. Its main areas of interest are: current developments in rule of law in domestic, transnational and international contextstheoretical issues related to the conceptualization and implementation of the rule of law in domestic and international contexts;the relation between the rule of law and economic development, democratization and human rights protection;historical analysis of rule of law;significant trends and initiatives in rule of law promotion (practitioner notes).The HJRL is supported by HiiL Innovating Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands and the Paul Scholten Center for Jurisprudence at the Law School of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Editorial PolicyThe HJRL welcomes contributions from academics and practitioners with expertise in any relevant field, including law, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology. It publishes two categories of articles: papers (appr. 6,000-10,000 words) and notes (appr. 2500 words). Papers are accepted on the basis of double blind peer-review. Notes are accepted on the basis of review by two or more editors of the journal. Manuscripts submitted to the HJRL must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Acceptance of the Editorial Board’s offer to publish, implies that the author agrees to an embargo on publication elsewhere for a period of two years following the date of publication in the HJRL.