{"title":"1L 课程有区别吗?","authors":"David A. Hyman, Jing Liu, Joshua C. Teitelbaum","doi":"10.1111/jels.12383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Georgetown Law's Curriculum B (also known as Section 3) offers a unique opportunity to study an alternative 1L curriculum. The standard 1L curriculum has been around for decades and is still offered at the vast majority of US law schools. Leaders in the legal academy often talk about experimenting with the 1L curriculum, but hardly anyone does it. Georgetown Law has. We study whether Georgetown's Curriculum B yields measurable differences in student outcomes. Our empirical design leverages the fact that enrollment in Curriculum B is done by lottery when it is oversubscribed—meaning our study is effectively a randomized controlled trial. We measure treatment effects of Curriculum B by comparing outcomes of students who received the treatment (Curriculum B) with outcomes of students who received the placebo (Curriculum A) but wanted the treatment. Because students in both the treatment and control groups elected to enroll in Curriculum B, our empirical design overcomes the issue of selection bias. We find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' performance in two business law electives (Corporations and Securities Regulation) and reduces the rate at which they graduate with Latin honors. In addition, we find that it increases students' propensity to take certain public law electives and decreases their propensity to take certain business law electives. We further find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' likelihood of working in the private sector (law firm or business/industry), increases their likelihood of working in the public sector (government or public interest) or doing a judicial clerkship, and reduces their average annual salary. At the same, however, we find no statistically significant effects on other outcomes, including students' cumulative grade point average, their chances of passing the bar exam or being employed 10 months after graduation, or their rate or amount of alumni giving.</p>","PeriodicalId":47187,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Legal Studies","volume":"21 2","pages":"375-423"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does the 1L curriculum make a difference?\",\"authors\":\"David A. Hyman, Jing Liu, Joshua C. 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Because students in both the treatment and control groups elected to enroll in Curriculum B, our empirical design overcomes the issue of selection bias. We find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' performance in two business law electives (Corporations and Securities Regulation) and reduces the rate at which they graduate with Latin honors. In addition, we find that it increases students' propensity to take certain public law electives and decreases their propensity to take certain business law electives. We further find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' likelihood of working in the private sector (law firm or business/industry), increases their likelihood of working in the public sector (government or public interest) or doing a judicial clerkship, and reduces their average annual salary. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
乔治城法学院的课程 B(也称为 Section 3)提供了学习另一种 1L 课程的独特机会。标准的 1L 课程已经存在了几十年,绝大多数美国法学院仍在使用。法学院的领导者经常谈论对 1L 课程进行实验,但几乎没有人这样做。乔治城法学院已经这样做了。我们研究了乔治城法学院的 B 课程是否在学生成绩方面产生了可衡量的差异。我们的实证设计利用了这样一个事实:当课程 B 超额招收时,学生可以通过抽签的方式入学,这意味着我们的研究实际上是一项随机对照试验。我们通过比较接受治疗(课程 B)的学生与接受安慰剂(课程 A)但希望接受治疗的学生的结果,来衡量课程 B 的治疗效果。由于治疗组和对照组的学生都选择参加课程 B,我们的实证设计克服了选择偏差的问题。我们发现,选修课程 B 会降低学生在两门商法选修课(《公司法》和《证券法规》)中的成绩,并降低他们以拉丁文优等成绩毕业的比率。此外,我们还发现,选修课程 B 增加了学生选修某些公法选修课的倾向,降低了他们选修某些商法选修课的倾向。我们还发现,选修课程 B 会降低学生在私营部门(律师事务所或企业/行业)工作的可能性,增加他们在公共部门(政府或公共利益部门)工作或担任司法书记员的可能性,并降低他们的平均年薪。但与此同时,我们发现对其他结果,包括学生的累积平均学分绩点、通过律师资格考试的几率或毕业 10 个月后就业的几率,以及校友捐赠的比例或金额,都没有统计学意义上的显著影响。
Georgetown Law's Curriculum B (also known as Section 3) offers a unique opportunity to study an alternative 1L curriculum. The standard 1L curriculum has been around for decades and is still offered at the vast majority of US law schools. Leaders in the legal academy often talk about experimenting with the 1L curriculum, but hardly anyone does it. Georgetown Law has. We study whether Georgetown's Curriculum B yields measurable differences in student outcomes. Our empirical design leverages the fact that enrollment in Curriculum B is done by lottery when it is oversubscribed—meaning our study is effectively a randomized controlled trial. We measure treatment effects of Curriculum B by comparing outcomes of students who received the treatment (Curriculum B) with outcomes of students who received the placebo (Curriculum A) but wanted the treatment. Because students in both the treatment and control groups elected to enroll in Curriculum B, our empirical design overcomes the issue of selection bias. We find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' performance in two business law electives (Corporations and Securities Regulation) and reduces the rate at which they graduate with Latin honors. In addition, we find that it increases students' propensity to take certain public law electives and decreases their propensity to take certain business law electives. We further find that taking Curriculum B decreases students' likelihood of working in the private sector (law firm or business/industry), increases their likelihood of working in the public sector (government or public interest) or doing a judicial clerkship, and reduces their average annual salary. At the same, however, we find no statistically significant effects on other outcomes, including students' cumulative grade point average, their chances of passing the bar exam or being employed 10 months after graduation, or their rate or amount of alumni giving.