乌尔意向性的出现:生态学建议

IF 0.6 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Manuel Heras-Escribano, Daniel Martínez Moreno
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引用次数: 0

摘要

激进的颁布主义支持激进的具身认知(REC),即基本或根本认知(感知和行动)不需要从表象和内容的角度来理解。激进具身认知摒弃了心智可以通过生物功能自然化的观点,但拒绝接受心智内容(被理解为具有表征性质)可以自然化的观点。对于 REC 来说,内容的自然起源(或 NOC)是一个基于以下假设的方案:首先,我们脱离了以目标为基础、由乌尔意向性或对世界的指向性所引导的基本认知过程,然后,当语言出现在场景中时,社会性进入了画面,允许建立完整的语义内容,其中的内容是关于世界事务的状态。在这里,我将重点讨论指向性现象,因为在这一图景中存在盲点:正如许多作者所声称的,REC 以乌尔意向性为起点,但迄今为止根本没有解释这种指向性或乌尔意向性是如何建立起来的。因此,我们如何解释 "乌尔意向性"?这种意向性是如何产生的?我们相信,如果我们引用生态知觉学习的最佳科学证据,特别是关于环境的作用以及在我们的学习过程中感知能力的信息,我们就能回答这个问题。这样,我们就能为自然界中最基本的认知形式(Ur-意向性或定向性)是如何产生的这一问题提供答案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Emergence of Ur-Intentionality: An Ecological Proposal
Radical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature, can be naturalized. For REC, the natural origins of content (or NOC) is a program based on the following hypothesis: first, we depart from basic cognitive processes that are target-based and guided by an Ur-intentionality or directedness toward the world, and then sociality enters in the picture when language appears into the scene, allowing for establishing full-blown semantic content in which that content is about worldly states of affairs. Here, I am going to focus on the phenomenon of directedness since there are blind spots in this picture: as many authors claim, REC takes Ur-intentionality as the starting point, but there is simply no explanation to date of how this directedness or Ur-intentionality is established. Therefore, how could we account for Ur-intentionality? How does this kind of intentionality emerge? We believe that we can answer this question if we invoke the best scientific evidence from ecological perceptual learning especially in regard to the role of the environment and the information for perceiving affordances in our learning processes. This allows us to offer an answer to the question of how the most basic form of cognition (Ur-intentionality or directedness) emerges in nature.
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来源期刊
Philosophies
Philosophies Multiple-
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
11.10%
发文量
122
审稿时长
11 weeks
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