蜈蚣游戏中的经典推理和团队推理

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 Q4 SOCIOLOGY
THEORIA Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI:10.1111/theo.12522
David Sklar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究分析了非零和有限多阶段博弈中的行为,尤其是蜈蚣博弈。经典的纳什均衡无法解释经验行为和直观逻辑,因此受到质疑。本文介绍了 "纯集体均衡"(Pure Collective Equilibrium),即 PCE,它描述了当代理人不是根据自己的收益,而是根据团队的平均集体收益来评估其效用时所达到的均衡,正如一些团队推理假设所概述的那样。因此,经典行为和纯粹的团队集体推理都是特殊情况--前者是指代理人及其对应方都处于纳什均衡路径上,后者是指代理人及其对应方都是纯粹的团队集体推理者。本文认为,在蜈蚣博弈中,即使没有慈善利他主义者或错误百出的人群,代理人也会有意且持续地偏离经典理性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Classical and team reasoning in the Centipede Game
This study analyses behaviour in non‐zero‐sum finite multi‐stage games, particularly the Centipede Game. The classical Nash Equilibrium fails to explain empirical behaviour and intuitive logic and has therefore been challenged. This paper introduces the ‘Pure Collective Equilibrium’, or PCE, which describes the equilibrium reached when agents assess their utility not by their own payoffs but by the mean collective payoff of the team, as outlined by some team‐reasoning hypotheses. Classical behaviour and purely collective team reasoning then both represent special cases—the first in which agents and their counterparts are on the Nash Equilibrium path, and the second in which agents and their counterparts are purely collective team reasoners. It is argued that agents intentionally and consistently deviate from classical rationality in the Centipede Game, even in the absence of philanthropic altruists or error‐plagued populations.
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来源期刊
THEORIA
THEORIA SOCIOLOGY-
CiteScore
0.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
审稿时长
24 weeks
期刊介绍: Since its foundation in 1935, Theoria publishes research in all areas of philosophy. Theoria is committed to precision and clarity in philosophical discussions, and encourages cooperation between philosophy and other disciplines. The journal is not affiliated with any particular school or faction. Instead, it promotes dialogues between different philosophical viewpoints. Theoria is peer-reviewed. It publishes articles, reviews, and shorter notes and discussions. Short discussion notes on recent articles in Theoria are welcome.
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