基于攻防博弈模型的负荷侧安全用电分析

Xiaodong Wang, Feixiang Gong, Songsong Chen, Bowen Zheng, Ping Zhang, Liye Zhao, Linru Jiang, Dongdong Zhang, Pengcheng Du
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着电力系统数字化、智能化水平的提高,电力系统的安全运行面临着巨大的挑战。负荷侧的安全用电是实现电力系统安全可靠运行的关键。当电网受到攻击时,检测方需要大量的人力和物力。针对目前检测能力低、检测成本高的困难,本文提出了一种考虑不同节点差异的攻防博弈模型,在保证用电安全和经济性的同时,减少能源浪费。首先,总结了智能电表的结构和入侵者的攻击特点,构建了基本的攻防博弈模型。然后求解纳什均衡,给出防御方与入侵方博弈的最优策略,以平衡检测性能与能耗之间的关系。针对每个节点产生的差异,探讨了攻击者对不同节点发起攻击的策略,以及防御系统中其他节点最佳阈值的设置。最后,案例研究验证了所提出的模型可以降低入侵者检测成本,同时确保特定的检测率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Analysis of safe electricity consumption on load side based on attack and defence game model
With the improvement of digitalization and intelligence in the power system, the safe operation of the power system is facing enormous challenges. The safe use of electricity on the load side is the key to achieving safe and reliable power system operation. The detection party needs amounts of human and material resources when the power network is attacked. In response to the current difficulties of low detection ability and high detection costs, this paper proposes an attack and defence game model that considers the differences between different nodes, ensuring the safety and economy of electricity consumption while reducing energy waste. At first, the structure of smart meters and the attack characteristics of intruders are summarized, and a basic attack and defence game model is constructed. The Nash equilibrium is then solved, and the optimal strategy for the game between the defender and the intruder is given to balance the relation between detection performance and energy consumption. In response to the differences generated by each node, strategies for attackers to launch attacks on different nodes and the setting of optimal thresholds for other nodes in the defence system are explored. Finally, case studies verify that the proposed model could reduce the cost of intruder detection while ensuring a specific detection rate.
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