{"title":"关于权力分享的鲍威尔模式和正式模式的评论","authors":"Jack Paine","doi":"10.1177/09516298241237218","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing\",\"authors\":\"Jack Paine\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/09516298241237218\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51606,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Theoretical Politics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Theoretical Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241237218\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298241237218","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing
Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.