法院优先的联邦主义:示范立法如何成为影响性诉讼

IF 4 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Dylan L. Yingling, Daniel J. Mallinson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在法院优先的新联邦主义下,各州和利益集团正在推动政府权力的重新分配。各州正在努力收回权力,而利益集团则在起草示范法时对其进行了战略性调整,以规避联邦法律的限制,一旦被各州采纳,就会促使联邦法院对其进行审查,因为各方都要通过诉讼来澄清自己的权利。各州不需要在诉讼中完全胜诉就能改变州与国家之间的权力平衡。为了验证这一论点,我们发现美国最高法院对美国立法交流委员会(ALEC)制定的样本中 17% 的示范法进行了审查,而其他案件中仅有 1% 的示范法获得了审查。最终,各州和 ALEC 在限制联邦权力方面取得了部分成功。因此,将示范立法、影响性诉讼和法院优先的联邦主义结合在一起,成为各州将权力从联邦政府手中收归己有的工具。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Courts-First Federalism: How Model Legislation Becomes Impact Litigation
States and interest groups are facilitating a redistribution of government powers under a new courts-first federalism. States are working to claw back powers while interest groups drafting model laws strategically tailor them to skirt the limits of federal law and, once adopted by states, prompt federal courts to review them as parties litigate to clarify their rights. States do not need to be completely successful in litigation to shift the balance of state–national power. Testing this argument, we find that the US Supreme Court grants review to 17% of model laws in our sample produced by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), whereas merely 1% of other cases are granted certiorari. Ultimately, the states and ALEC were partly successful in constraining federal power. Thus, the combination of model legislation, impact litigation, and courts-first federalism becomes a tool for states to draw power to themselves and from the federal government.
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来源期刊
Perspectives on Politics
Perspectives on Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
5.30%
发文量
313
期刊介绍: Perspectives on Politics is a journal of broad interest to scholars across many fields, in addition to professional political scientists, political analysts, policy makers, and the informed public. Essays synthesize and extend significant research and developments in all dimensions of political science scholarship. In many cases, the journal aims to connect research findings, conceptual innovations, or theoretical developments to real problems of politics.
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