{"title":"评估俄罗斯银行关键利率决策的可预测性及其预测的信息优势","authors":"M. I. Abdurakhmanov","doi":"10.32609/0042-8736-2024-4-70-91","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The communication policy of central banks plays a significant role in setting the expectations of economic agents. If key rate decisions are inconsistent with market expectations, managing expectations and anchoring inflation expectations may be difficult. We assess the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s key rate decisions over the 2021—2023 period in two ways: using media surveys of analysts and shifts in the Russian government bond index and the daily volatility of its yield. The results show a significant impact of unexpected key rate decisions on Russian government bond prices and daily volatility. Then, using statistical metrics computed from macroeconomic survey data and another linear and piecewise linear model, we find the informational advantage of the Bank of Russia in predicting the key rate. The decisions unexpected for the market are explained by the information advantage of the Bank of Russia, as well as the realization of geopolitical and inflation risks in the period under study. Thus, we conclude that there is a need to improve the quality of communication regarding future decisions. As the communication policy develops, the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s decisions on the key rate will increase. In turn, economic agents and market participants will adapt to the expected decisions in advance, which will accelerate the achievement of the inflation target and the adjustment of inflation expectations.","PeriodicalId":45534,"journal":{"name":"Voprosy Ekonomiki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Assessing the predictability of the Bank of Russia decisions on the key rate and informational advantage in its forecasting\",\"authors\":\"M. I. Abdurakhmanov\",\"doi\":\"10.32609/0042-8736-2024-4-70-91\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The communication policy of central banks plays a significant role in setting the expectations of economic agents. If key rate decisions are inconsistent with market expectations, managing expectations and anchoring inflation expectations may be difficult. We assess the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s key rate decisions over the 2021—2023 period in two ways: using media surveys of analysts and shifts in the Russian government bond index and the daily volatility of its yield. The results show a significant impact of unexpected key rate decisions on Russian government bond prices and daily volatility. Then, using statistical metrics computed from macroeconomic survey data and another linear and piecewise linear model, we find the informational advantage of the Bank of Russia in predicting the key rate. The decisions unexpected for the market are explained by the information advantage of the Bank of Russia, as well as the realization of geopolitical and inflation risks in the period under study. Thus, we conclude that there is a need to improve the quality of communication regarding future decisions. As the communication policy develops, the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s decisions on the key rate will increase. In turn, economic agents and market participants will adapt to the expected decisions in advance, which will accelerate the achievement of the inflation target and the adjustment of inflation expectations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45534,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Voprosy Ekonomiki\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Voprosy Ekonomiki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-4-70-91\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Voprosy Ekonomiki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-4-70-91","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Assessing the predictability of the Bank of Russia decisions on the key rate and informational advantage in its forecasting
The communication policy of central banks plays a significant role in setting the expectations of economic agents. If key rate decisions are inconsistent with market expectations, managing expectations and anchoring inflation expectations may be difficult. We assess the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s key rate decisions over the 2021—2023 period in two ways: using media surveys of analysts and shifts in the Russian government bond index and the daily volatility of its yield. The results show a significant impact of unexpected key rate decisions on Russian government bond prices and daily volatility. Then, using statistical metrics computed from macroeconomic survey data and another linear and piecewise linear model, we find the informational advantage of the Bank of Russia in predicting the key rate. The decisions unexpected for the market are explained by the information advantage of the Bank of Russia, as well as the realization of geopolitical and inflation risks in the period under study. Thus, we conclude that there is a need to improve the quality of communication regarding future decisions. As the communication policy develops, the predictability of the Bank of Russia’s decisions on the key rate will increase. In turn, economic agents and market participants will adapt to the expected decisions in advance, which will accelerate the achievement of the inflation target and the adjustment of inflation expectations.