非理性信念的合理理由。

M. Barlev, Steven L. Neuberg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多人认为,我们生活在一个 "后真相 "时代,无处不在的谬误对民主和自由社会的运作构成了生存威胁。人们为什么会相信和传播谬误?目前的说法主要集中在心理缺陷、启发式错误、自我强化动机和制造混乱的动机上。在此,我们提出一种互补的、外向型(相对于内向型)和终极型(相对于近似型)的观点,即人们相信和传播谬误往往是出于社会功能性原因。根据这种观点,谬误可以作为稀有和有价值的信息来提高声望,作为群体承诺和忠诚度测试的信号,作为贬低对手的弹药,或者作为动员群体实现共同目标的暴行。因此,尽管人们经常通过在认识论上不合理的过程来产生和维护谬误,但从谬误的功能角度来看,这样做可能是合理的。我们将讨论这一观点对困惑理论现象和改变问题信念的影响。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rational reasons for irrational beliefs.
According to many, we live in "posttruth" times, with the pervasiveness of falsehoods being an existential threat to democracy and the functioning of free societies. Why do people believe and propagate falsehoods? Current accounts focus on psychological deficiencies, heuristic errors, self-enhancing motivations, and motivations to sow chaos. Here, we advance a complementary, outwardly (vs. inwardly) oriented, and ultimate (vs. proximate) account that people often believe and spread falsehoods for socially functional reasons. Under this view, falsehoods can serve as rare and valued information with which to rise in prestige, as signals of group commitment and loyalty tests, as ammunition with which to derogate rivals, or as outrages with which to mobilize the group toward shared goals. Thus, although people often generate and defend falsehoods through processes that are epistemically irrational, doing so might be rational from the perspective of the functions falsehoods serve. We discuss the implications of this view for puzzling theoretical phenomena and changing problematic beliefs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
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