动物与人工智能:非人类作为道德代理人?

Barbora Baďurová
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引用次数: 0

摘要

关于呈指数增长的人工智能的地位和影响,有一个广受争议的问题。本文探讨了动物和人工智能的道德主体问题。作者探讨了道德主体的几个标准,并试图找到我们能否将动物和人工智能视为道德主体这一问题的答案。作者主要采用哲学分析法和比较法。作者认为,道德能动性并不是道德地位的必要条件,并对赋予动物和人工智能完全道德能动性的实用性表示怀疑。此外,作者还声称道德代理是有程度和种类之分的,因此我们在处理道德行为时必须考虑道德代理的复杂性。例如,正如经验证据和美德伦理学所表明的那样,即使是人类道德主体,其发展水平也不尽相同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Animals and Artificial Intelligence: Nonhumans as Moral Agents?
There is a widely debated issue regarding the status and impact of exponentially growing artificial intelligence. The article deals with the problem of the moral agency of animals, and artificial intelligence. The author addresses several criteria for moral agents and tries to find the answer to the question of whether we can treat animals and AI as moral agents. The author uses mostly method of philosophical analysis and comparative method. The author claims that moral agency is not a necessary condition for moral status and doubts the practicality of attributing full moral agency to animals and AI. Moreover, claims that moral agency comes in degrees and different kinds and therefore we have to consider the complex nature of moral agency when dealing with moral actions. For instance, even human moral agents are not all on the same level of development as suggested not just by empirical evidence but also virtue ethics.
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