文化战争的文化理论

IF 4 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
B. Swedlow, Joseph T. Ripberger, Meng Yuan
{"title":"文化战争的文化理论","authors":"B. Swedlow, Joseph T. Ripberger, Meng Yuan","doi":"10.1111/pops.12968","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.","PeriodicalId":48332,"journal":{"name":"Political Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A cultural theory of the culture wars\",\"authors\":\"B. Swedlow, Joseph T. Ripberger, Meng Yuan\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/pops.12968\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48332,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Political Psychology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Political Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12968\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12968","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们以文化理论为基础,首次在政治心理学和舆论文献中对文化战争进行了阐述。利用网格-群体文化理论(CT)的创新测量方法,我们在 2011 年至 2022 年的美国年度全国调查中识别了与意识形态和党派认同相关的文化,这是一个由 24,870 名受访者组成的独特数据集。正如假设的那样,我们发现文化战争不仅发生在意识形态和党派之间,而且发生在他们之间,因为他们从不同的、相对稳定但不断变化的文化联盟中获得支持。平等主义的自由主义者和民主党人与个人主义的保守主义者和共和党人(较少出现的是宿命论者),以及等级制的保守主义者和共和党人展开了斗争。正如假设的那样,宿命论者是最不可靠的联盟伙伴,正如预期的那样,在特朗普当选后的2017年,他们倾向于共和党和保守派。然而,具有强烈党派认同的宿命论者从未叛变。此外,我们关于宿命论者对特朗普的吸引力会推动其政治认同叛变的假设在很大程度上失效了。相反,在我们的总体分析以及强、弱意识形态和党派认同者的子分析中,宿命论者大多逃离特朗普。在 2016 年和 2018-2022 年,独立宿命论者似乎导致宿命论者倾向于自由党和民主党。意想不到的是,等级主义者在 2022 年也会倾向于自由派和民主派,这显然是对特朗普在 2020 年大选中失利的多线攻击的反应。我们确定了可以结束特定文化战争的文化联盟的基础,包括目前发生在平等主义者和个人主义者之间的最重要的文化战争,最后提出了进一步研究的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A cultural theory of the culture wars
We provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
8.00
自引率
6.50%
发文量
70
期刊介绍: Understanding the psychological aspects of national and international political developments is increasingly important in this age of international tension and sweeping political change. Political Psychology, the journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, is dedicated to the analysis of the interrelationships between psychological and political processes. International contributors draw on a diverse range of sources, including clinical and cognitive psychology, economics, history, international relations, philosophy, political science, political theory, sociology, personality and social psychology.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信