股东交叉持有贷款人股权时:对银行贷款成本的影响

IF 3.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Jing Wang , Liying Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的研究表明,当借款人的股东交叉持有更多贷款人的股权时,银团贷款利差就会降低。除了控制借款人和贷款人的固定效应以及其他各种所有权衡量指标外,我们还利用机构投资者的合并进行了差异分析,从而解决了内生性问题。对交叉持股股东的持股期、活跃交叉持股人的影响、不同程度股东与债权人冲突的借款人子样本、借款人在贷款启动前后的风险变化以及财务契约的数量进行的其他检验,为借款人股东持有贷款人的股权会降低债务的代理成本这一假设提供了支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When shareholders cross-hold lenders’ equity: The effects on the costs of bank loans

We show that syndicated loan spreads are lower as borrowers’ shareholders cross-hold more lenders’ equity. Apart from controlling for borrower and lender fixed effects and various other ownership measures, we address endogeneity concerns by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the mergers of institutional investors. Additional tests on cross-holding shareholders’ holding period, the impact of active cross-holders, subsamples of borrowers subject to different degrees of shareholder–creditor conflicts, changes in borrower risk around loan initiation, and the number of financial covenants provide support for the hypothesis that borrower shareholders’ equity holdings of lenders reduce agency costs of debt.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.40%
发文量
262
期刊介绍: The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.
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