{"title":"论开源应用程序日志在数字取证方面的不足","authors":"Afiqah Azahari, Davide Balzarotti","doi":"10.1016/j.fsidi.2024.301750","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study explores the challenges with utilizing application logs for incident response or forensic analysis. Application logs have the potential to significantly enhance security analysis as sometimes they provide information regarding user actions, error messages, and performance metrics of the application. Although these logs can offer vital information about user activities, errors, and application performance, their use for security needs better understanding. We looked at the current logging implementation of 60 open-source applications. We checked the logs to see if they could help with five key security tasks: making timelines, linking events, separating different actions, spotting misuse, and detecting attacks. By examining source code, extracting log statements, and evaluating them for security relevance, we found many logs lacked essential elements. Specifically, 29 applications omitted timestamps, crucial for identifying the timing of actions. Furthermore, logs frequently missed unique identifiers (UIDs) for event correlation, with 23 not noting UIDs for new activities. Inconsistent logging of user activities and an absence of logs detailing successful attacks indicate current application logs need significant enhancements to be effective for security checks. The findings of our research suggest that current application logs are inadequately equipped for in-depth security analysis. Enhancements are imperative for their optimal utility. This investigation underscores the inherent challenges in leveraging logs for security and emphasizes the pressing need for refining logging methodologies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48481,"journal":{"name":"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the inadequacy of open-source application logs for digital forensics\",\"authors\":\"Afiqah Azahari, Davide Balzarotti\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.fsidi.2024.301750\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This study explores the challenges with utilizing application logs for incident response or forensic analysis. Application logs have the potential to significantly enhance security analysis as sometimes they provide information regarding user actions, error messages, and performance metrics of the application. Although these logs can offer vital information about user activities, errors, and application performance, their use for security needs better understanding. We looked at the current logging implementation of 60 open-source applications. We checked the logs to see if they could help with five key security tasks: making timelines, linking events, separating different actions, spotting misuse, and detecting attacks. By examining source code, extracting log statements, and evaluating them for security relevance, we found many logs lacked essential elements. Specifically, 29 applications omitted timestamps, crucial for identifying the timing of actions. Furthermore, logs frequently missed unique identifiers (UIDs) for event correlation, with 23 not noting UIDs for new activities. Inconsistent logging of user activities and an absence of logs detailing successful attacks indicate current application logs need significant enhancements to be effective for security checks. The findings of our research suggest that current application logs are inadequately equipped for in-depth security analysis. Enhancements are imperative for their optimal utility. This investigation underscores the inherent challenges in leveraging logs for security and emphasizes the pressing need for refining logging methodologies.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48481,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666281724000696\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"医学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forensic Science International-Digital Investigation","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666281724000696","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the inadequacy of open-source application logs for digital forensics
This study explores the challenges with utilizing application logs for incident response or forensic analysis. Application logs have the potential to significantly enhance security analysis as sometimes they provide information regarding user actions, error messages, and performance metrics of the application. Although these logs can offer vital information about user activities, errors, and application performance, their use for security needs better understanding. We looked at the current logging implementation of 60 open-source applications. We checked the logs to see if they could help with five key security tasks: making timelines, linking events, separating different actions, spotting misuse, and detecting attacks. By examining source code, extracting log statements, and evaluating them for security relevance, we found many logs lacked essential elements. Specifically, 29 applications omitted timestamps, crucial for identifying the timing of actions. Furthermore, logs frequently missed unique identifiers (UIDs) for event correlation, with 23 not noting UIDs for new activities. Inconsistent logging of user activities and an absence of logs detailing successful attacks indicate current application logs need significant enhancements to be effective for security checks. The findings of our research suggest that current application logs are inadequately equipped for in-depth security analysis. Enhancements are imperative for their optimal utility. This investigation underscores the inherent challenges in leveraging logs for security and emphasizes the pressing need for refining logging methodologies.