负担、贿赂和官僚:小腐败和行政负担的政治经济学

IF 5.2 1区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Fernando Nieto-Morales, Rik Peeters, Gabriela Lotta
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引用次数: 0

摘要

贿赂和其他形式的小腐败通常出现在官僚主义的交锋中,是许多国家,尤其是机构薄弱的国家日常经历中的常见元素。这类腐败尤其令人头疼,因为它会给公民在获取他们正式有权享有的服务和福利时造成直接成本。然而,只有少数研究涉及官僚互动的情境属性如何为公民行贿提供动机,以及如何为街道官僚索贿提供机会。我们提供了行政负担会增加贿赂机会的证据,有助于填补这一空白。为此,我们使用多层次逻辑回归分析法,分析了 20 种不同类型官僚接触(从纳税到获得基本服务)的 63,000 多次互动中(试图)行贿的普遍性。我们的研究有助于了解行政负担可能造成的后果,以及在具体的公民与国家互动中助长小腐败的因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Burdens, Bribes, and Bureaucrats: The Political Economy of Petty Corruption and Administrative Burdens
Bribery and other forms of petty corruption typically arise in bureaucratic encounters and are a common element of the everyday experience of the state in many countries, particularly in places with weak institutions. This type of corruption is especially troublesome because it creates direct costs for citizens when accessing services and benefits to which they are formally entitled. However, only a few studies deal with how situational attributes of bureaucratic interactions create incentives for citizens to pay bribes and opportunities for street-level bureaucrats to demand them. We contribute to filling this gap by providing evidence that administrative burdens increase the chance of bribery. We do so by analyzing the prevalence of (attempted) bribery in more than 63,000 interactions across 20 different types of bureaucratic encounters, ranging from paying taxes to accessing essential services, using multilevel logistic regression analysis. Our study contributes to understanding the possible consequences of administrative burdens and the factors conducive to petty corruption in specific citizen-state interactions.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.50
自引率
11.90%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory serves as a bridge between public administration or public management scholarship and public policy studies. The Journal aims to provide in-depth analysis of developments in the organizational, administrative, and policy sciences as they apply to government and governance. Each issue brings you critical perspectives and cogent analyses, serving as an outlet for the best theoretical and research work in the field. The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory is the official journal of the Public Management Research Association.
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