Fernando Nieto-Morales, Rik Peeters, Gabriela Lotta
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Burdens, Bribes, and Bureaucrats: The Political Economy of Petty Corruption and Administrative Burdens
Bribery and other forms of petty corruption typically arise in bureaucratic encounters and are a common element of the everyday experience of the state in many countries, particularly in places with weak institutions. This type of corruption is especially troublesome because it creates direct costs for citizens when accessing services and benefits to which they are formally entitled. However, only a few studies deal with how situational attributes of bureaucratic interactions create incentives for citizens to pay bribes and opportunities for street-level bureaucrats to demand them. We contribute to filling this gap by providing evidence that administrative burdens increase the chance of bribery. We do so by analyzing the prevalence of (attempted) bribery in more than 63,000 interactions across 20 different types of bureaucratic encounters, ranging from paying taxes to accessing essential services, using multilevel logistic regression analysis. Our study contributes to understanding the possible consequences of administrative burdens and the factors conducive to petty corruption in specific citizen-state interactions.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory serves as a bridge between public administration or public management scholarship and public policy studies. The Journal aims to provide in-depth analysis of developments in the organizational, administrative, and policy sciences as they apply to government and governance. Each issue brings you critical perspectives and cogent analyses, serving as an outlet for the best theoretical and research work in the field. The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory is the official journal of the Public Management Research Association.