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Collusion, shading, internal and external auditing in the simple hierarchical agency
This paper introduces a model combining “shading” from behavioral contract theory and collusion in hierarchical organizations to analyze optimal auditing strategies. It investigates whether interna...
期刊介绍:
The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.