Auditor tenure and non-GAAP earnings

Purpose

This study aims to examine whether the newly available auditor tenure information is associated with non-GAAP earnings, as the recent requirement to disclose the initial year of auditor-client relationship in audit reports may give the impression that longer auditor tenure may be related to lower audit quality.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a sample of firm-quarters from 2017 to 2020, the authors conduct both univariate and regression analyses. We use hand-collected data for auditor tenure, SEC comment letters, and non-GAAP variables.

Findings

First, the authors find that the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings monotonically increases with auditor tenure on a univariate basis. Second, auditor tenure is negatively associated with aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Third, the authors document evidence of aggressive reporting in general; that is, items excluded in calculating non-GAAP earnings are associated with future performance. However, the association declines with longer auditor tenure. Finally, the authors report evidence that the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter that contains non-GAAP comments decreases with longer auditor tenure.

Practical implications

The results show that regulators need to consider both GAAP and non-GAAP disclosures’ costs and benefits when enacting auditor tenure regulation. Investors can benefit from the findings in evaluating the quality of non-GAAP earnings. The findings are also relevant to the SEC when allocating limited resources in monitoring non-GAAP reporting.

Originality/value

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study showing that auditor tenure is associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Given that financial reporting quality should be understood as a comprehensive system comprising both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, this study complements the literature that examines the effect of auditor tenure on financial reporting quality using GAAP reporting.