碳排放和异常现金持有量

Abu Amin, Ashrafee T. Hossain, Abdullah‐Al Masum
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现,碳排放量高的公司的异常现金持有量往往较低。我们进行了一系列内生性测试,以确保我们的研究结果的稳健性。我们的进一步分析表明,较弱的内部治理、较高的信息不对称和首席执行官的过度自信导致了结果的异质性。此外,我们注意到,污染企业倾向于在资本投资上投入更多,而在股利和研发活动上投入较少。我们的结果与代理理论一致,表明管理者偏好次优投资和/或避免外部约束可能会导致较低的异常现金持有量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Carbon emissions and abnormal cash holdings
We find that companies that emit high levels of carbon tend to have lower abnormal cash holdings. We have run a battery of endogeneity tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. Our further analysis revealed that weaker internal governance, higher information asymmetry and CEO overconfidence contribute to the heterogeneity of the results. Additionally, we notice that polluting firms prefer to spend more on capital investments while allocating less toward dividends and R&D activities. Our results are consistent with agency theory, indicating that managerial preference for suboptimal investment and/or avoidance of external disciplining might contribute to lower abnormal cash holdings.
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