机构投资者会处理信息并采取行动吗？来自并购目标的证据

IF 1.9 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Corporate Finance Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI:10.1093/rcfs/cfae006

Kirak Kim, Ellie Luu, Fangming Xu

{"title":"机构投资者会处理信息并采取行动吗？来自并购目标的证据","authors":"Kirak Kim, Ellie Luu, Fangming Xu","doi":"10.1093/rcfs/cfae006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We document important links between targets’ institutional ownership and takeover-bid outcomes. Firms’ institutional ownership increases the likelihood of receiving stock-for-stock bids. The impact becomes stronger when information asymmetries are higher, whereas we find little support for alternative channels, such as bidder misvaluation or target-side adverse selection. The information channel is further buttressed in our analyses of institutions’ share-retention decisions, targets’ demand for top-tier advisors, collar provisions, and targets’ share of expected synergies. Our findings suggest that institutions’ information advantage facilitates rational payment design and targets’ bargaining power gains, alleviating deadweight losses associated with stock-for-stock offers. (JEL G23, G32, G34)","PeriodicalId":44656,"journal":{"name":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Institutional Investors Process and Act on Information? Evidence from M&A Targets\",\"authors\":\"Kirak Kim, Ellie Luu, Fangming Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/rcfs/cfae006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We document important links between targets’ institutional ownership and takeover-bid outcomes. Firms’ institutional ownership increases the likelihood of receiving stock-for-stock bids. The impact becomes stronger when information asymmetries are higher, whereas we find little support for alternative channels, such as bidder misvaluation or target-side adverse selection. The information channel is further buttressed in our analyses of institutions’ share-retention decisions, targets’ demand for top-tier advisors, collar provisions, and targets’ share of expected synergies. Our findings suggest that institutions’ information advantage facilitates rational payment design and targets’ bargaining power gains, alleviating deadweight losses associated with stock-for-stock offers. (JEL G23, G32, G34)\",\"PeriodicalId\":44656,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Corporate Finance Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfae006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfae006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们记录了目标公司的机构所有权与收购出价结果之间的重要联系。公司的机构所有权增加了接受以股换股竞购的可能性。当信息不对称程度越高时，这种影响就越大，而我们几乎找不到其他渠道的支持，如竞购者错误估值或目标方逆向选择。我们对机构的股份保留决策、目标公司对顶级顾问的需求、领项条款以及目标公司在预期协同效应中所占的份额进行了分析，进一步证实了信息渠道的作用。我们的研究结果表明，机构的信息优势有利于合理的支付设计和目标公司的议价能力收益，从而减轻了与股票换股票要约相关的死重损失。(JEL G23, G32, G34)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Do Institutional Investors Process and Act on Information? Evidence from M&A Targets

We document important links between targets’ institutional ownership and takeover-bid outcomes. Firms’ institutional ownership increases the likelihood of receiving stock-for-stock bids. The impact becomes stronger when information asymmetries are higher, whereas we find little support for alternative channels, such as bidder misvaluation or target-side adverse selection. The information channel is further buttressed in our analyses of institutions’ share-retention decisions, targets’ demand for top-tier advisors, collar provisions, and targets’ share of expected synergies. Our findings suggest that institutions’ information advantage facilitates rational payment design and targets’ bargaining power gains, alleviating deadweight losses associated with stock-for-stock offers. (JEL G23, G32, G34)

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Review of Corporate Finance Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

1.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.