Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon, Sara B. Moller
{"title":"能否两全其美?无人认领的胁迫行为中的归属问题和似是而非的推诿问题","authors":"Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon, Sara B. Moller","doi":"10.1017/eis.2024.14","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"States and non-state actors conduct unclaimed coercive attacks, inflicting costs on adversaries to signal resolve to prevail in a dispute while refraining from claiming or denying responsibility. Analysts argue that targets often know who is responsible, which enables coercive communication, and that the lack of claims of responsibility grants coercers plausible deniability in the eyes of third parties. The puzzle of different audiences holding different beliefs about who is behind an unclaimed attack, even when they may have the same information, has been neglected. We address this puzzle by theorising that targets and third parties tend to reach different conclusions due to distinct emotional reactions: targets are more likely to experience anger, which induces certainty and a desire to blame someone, as well as heuristic and biased information processing, prompting confident attribution despite the limited evidence. A vignette-based experiment depicting a terrorist attack lends empirical plausibility to our argument.","PeriodicalId":44394,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of International Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can you have it both ways? Attribution and plausible deniability in unclaimed coercion\",\"authors\":\"Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon, Sara B. Moller\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/eis.2024.14\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"States and non-state actors conduct unclaimed coercive attacks, inflicting costs on adversaries to signal resolve to prevail in a dispute while refraining from claiming or denying responsibility. Analysts argue that targets often know who is responsible, which enables coercive communication, and that the lack of claims of responsibility grants coercers plausible deniability in the eyes of third parties. The puzzle of different audiences holding different beliefs about who is behind an unclaimed attack, even when they may have the same information, has been neglected. We address this puzzle by theorising that targets and third parties tend to reach different conclusions due to distinct emotional reactions: targets are more likely to experience anger, which induces certainty and a desire to blame someone, as well as heuristic and biased information processing, prompting confident attribution despite the limited evidence. A vignette-based experiment depicting a terrorist attack lends empirical plausibility to our argument.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44394,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of International Security\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of International Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2024.14\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of International Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2024.14","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can you have it both ways? Attribution and plausible deniability in unclaimed coercion
States and non-state actors conduct unclaimed coercive attacks, inflicting costs on adversaries to signal resolve to prevail in a dispute while refraining from claiming or denying responsibility. Analysts argue that targets often know who is responsible, which enables coercive communication, and that the lack of claims of responsibility grants coercers plausible deniability in the eyes of third parties. The puzzle of different audiences holding different beliefs about who is behind an unclaimed attack, even when they may have the same information, has been neglected. We address this puzzle by theorising that targets and third parties tend to reach different conclusions due to distinct emotional reactions: targets are more likely to experience anger, which induces certainty and a desire to blame someone, as well as heuristic and biased information processing, prompting confident attribution despite the limited evidence. A vignette-based experiment depicting a terrorist attack lends empirical plausibility to our argument.