贷款人对并购收益的影响

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107171

Nadia Massoud, Keke Song, Nam Tran

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用文本分析来识别由企业贷款资助的并购（M&As），并表明在贷款资助的并购中，收购方的公告回报率更高。利用工具变量方法和准自然实验，我们提供了证据，证明贷款人促成了贷款融资并购中更高的收购方回报率。我们的研究结果支持这样一种观点，即贷款人筛选和监督借款人的能力各不相同，而且他们的能力具有持续性。我们还发现证据表明，贷款人参与并购市场可以解决并购交易质量的不确定性，通过防止破坏价值的并购来改善公司治理，并为收购方股东提供长期的监督利益。

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Lender effects on gains from mergers and acquisitions

We employ textual analysis to identify mergers and acquisitions (M&As) financed by corporate loans and show that acquirer announcement returns are higher in loan-financed M&As. Utilizing an instrumental variable approach and a quasi-natural experiment, we provide evidence that lenders contribute to the higher acquirer returns in loan-financed M&As. Our findings support the view that lenders differ in their ability to screen and monitor borrowers and that their ability is persistent. We also find evidence that lenders’ participation in the M&A market can resolve uncertainty about M&A deal quality, improve corporate governance by preventing value-destroying M&As, and provide long-term monitoring benefits to acquirer shareholders.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.