水库渔业中的渔民是俘虏劳工吗?考察印度中央邦和拉贾斯坦邦的治理模式和经济学

Q3 Environmental Science
Khemraj Bunkar, Ananthan Pachampalayam Shanmugam, Neha Wajahat Qureshi, Sundaramoorthy Chandrasekaran, Laxmi Lal Sharma
{"title":"水库渔业中的渔民是俘虏劳工吗?考察印度中央邦和拉贾斯坦邦的治理模式和经济学","authors":"Khemraj Bunkar,&nbsp;Ananthan Pachampalayam Shanmugam,&nbsp;Neha Wajahat Qureshi,&nbsp;Sundaramoorthy Chandrasekaran,&nbsp;Laxmi Lal Sharma","doi":"10.1111/lre.12446","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Inland fisheries are a source of fish as well as livelihoods for as many as 82% of the total 28 million engaged in the Indian fisheries sector. Reservoir fisheries are a significant component but remain largely untapped, both as a potential resource for development as well as a site of academic interest. The importance of institutional arrangements in governing natural resources is fairly recognized. However, empirical examination of how governance regimes interact with and impact the economic benefits from natural resource extraction for its principal actors is less explored, at least in the Indian context. Through case studies of two uniquely located and differently governed fisheries of Gandhi Sagar (GS, Madhya Pradesh) and Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS, Rajasthan) reservoirs in the Chambal River valley, it investigates the (in)equity in benefit sharing among labour (fishers), capital (fishing contractor), and the management (custodian-state). Neither a purely <i>revenue model</i> of reservoir fisheries governance in RPS nor a seemingly <i>revenue</i> cum <i>welfare model</i> in GS has enhanced the income of nearly 2590 small-scale fishers above their subsistence levels, though the latter provides welfare benefits to its 2209 dependent fishers through cooperatives. Of the gross annual income of INR 13,874/ha in GS and INR 16,126/ha in RPS, the <i>fishers</i> have only one-third share in both cases, while the <i>fishing contractors</i> have 22% (GS) and 34% (RPS), and the <i>resource managers</i> have 29% (GS) and 15% (RPS) share, with the remaining 15% (GS) and 18% (RPS) accounted for by other costs, making the benefit sharing arrangement inequitable for fishers. Two key reforms, immediate market-linked upward revision of sale-price at which fish caught by fishers are collected by the contractors (from INR 33/kg to INR 65/kg), and long-term organization of fisher cooperatives as empowered collectives able to exercise their agency and co-manage the resource, are essential to ensure the fishers do not become captive labourers.</p>","PeriodicalId":39473,"journal":{"name":"Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are fishers captive labourers in reservoir fisheries? Examining governance models and economics in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, India\",\"authors\":\"Khemraj Bunkar,&nbsp;Ananthan Pachampalayam Shanmugam,&nbsp;Neha Wajahat Qureshi,&nbsp;Sundaramoorthy Chandrasekaran,&nbsp;Laxmi Lal Sharma\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/lre.12446\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Inland fisheries are a source of fish as well as livelihoods for as many as 82% of the total 28 million engaged in the Indian fisheries sector. Reservoir fisheries are a significant component but remain largely untapped, both as a potential resource for development as well as a site of academic interest. The importance of institutional arrangements in governing natural resources is fairly recognized. However, empirical examination of how governance regimes interact with and impact the economic benefits from natural resource extraction for its principal actors is less explored, at least in the Indian context. Through case studies of two uniquely located and differently governed fisheries of Gandhi Sagar (GS, Madhya Pradesh) and Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS, Rajasthan) reservoirs in the Chambal River valley, it investigates the (in)equity in benefit sharing among labour (fishers), capital (fishing contractor), and the management (custodian-state). Neither a purely <i>revenue model</i> of reservoir fisheries governance in RPS nor a seemingly <i>revenue</i> cum <i>welfare model</i> in GS has enhanced the income of nearly 2590 small-scale fishers above their subsistence levels, though the latter provides welfare benefits to its 2209 dependent fishers through cooperatives. Of the gross annual income of INR 13,874/ha in GS and INR 16,126/ha in RPS, the <i>fishers</i> have only one-third share in both cases, while the <i>fishing contractors</i> have 22% (GS) and 34% (RPS), and the <i>resource managers</i> have 29% (GS) and 15% (RPS) share, with the remaining 15% (GS) and 18% (RPS) accounted for by other costs, making the benefit sharing arrangement inequitable for fishers. Two key reforms, immediate market-linked upward revision of sale-price at which fish caught by fishers are collected by the contractors (from INR 33/kg to INR 65/kg), and long-term organization of fisher cooperatives as empowered collectives able to exercise their agency and co-manage the resource, are essential to ensure the fishers do not become captive labourers.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":39473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lre.12446\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Environmental Science\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lre.12446","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Environmental Science","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

内陆渔业是印度渔业部门 2800 万从业人员中多达 82% 的人的鱼类来源和生计来源。水库渔业是一个重要组成部分,但在很大程度上仍未得到开发,既是潜在的发展资源,也是学术界感兴趣的领域。制度安排在管理自然资源方面的重要性已得到广泛认可。然而,对治理制度如何与自然资源开采的主要参与者相互作用并影响其经济效益的实证研究却较少,至少在印度是如此。通过对 Chambal 河流域甘地萨加尔(GS,中央邦)和拉纳普拉塔普萨加尔(RPS,拉贾斯坦邦)水库这两个位置独特、治理方式不同的渔业的案例研究,调查了劳动力(渔民)、资本(渔业承包商)和管理部门(监护国)之间利益分享的(不)公平性。无论是 RPS 的纯收入水库渔业治理模式,还是 GS 的看似收入兼福利的模式,都没有使近 2590 名小型渔民的收入提高到维持生计的水平以上,尽管后者通过合作社为其 2209 名依附渔民提供了福利。在 GS 和 RPS 分别为 13,874 印度卢比/公顷和 16,126 印度卢比/公顷的年总收入中,渔民均只占三分之一的份额,而捕鱼承包商占 22%(GS)和 34%(RPS),资源管理者占 29%(GS)和 15%(RPS),其余 15%(GS)和 18%(RPS)为其他费用,这使得渔民的利益分享安排不公平。为确保渔民不会成为被俘虏的劳动力,必须进行两项关键改革,即立即与市场挂钩,上调承包商收取渔民捕获的鱼的销售价格(从 33 卢比/公斤上调至 65 卢比/公斤),并长期组织渔民合作社,使其成为有能力行使代理权和共同管理资源的集体。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are fishers captive labourers in reservoir fisheries? Examining governance models and economics in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, India

Inland fisheries are a source of fish as well as livelihoods for as many as 82% of the total 28 million engaged in the Indian fisheries sector. Reservoir fisheries are a significant component but remain largely untapped, both as a potential resource for development as well as a site of academic interest. The importance of institutional arrangements in governing natural resources is fairly recognized. However, empirical examination of how governance regimes interact with and impact the economic benefits from natural resource extraction for its principal actors is less explored, at least in the Indian context. Through case studies of two uniquely located and differently governed fisheries of Gandhi Sagar (GS, Madhya Pradesh) and Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS, Rajasthan) reservoirs in the Chambal River valley, it investigates the (in)equity in benefit sharing among labour (fishers), capital (fishing contractor), and the management (custodian-state). Neither a purely revenue model of reservoir fisheries governance in RPS nor a seemingly revenue cum welfare model in GS has enhanced the income of nearly 2590 small-scale fishers above their subsistence levels, though the latter provides welfare benefits to its 2209 dependent fishers through cooperatives. Of the gross annual income of INR 13,874/ha in GS and INR 16,126/ha in RPS, the fishers have only one-third share in both cases, while the fishing contractors have 22% (GS) and 34% (RPS), and the resource managers have 29% (GS) and 15% (RPS) share, with the remaining 15% (GS) and 18% (RPS) accounted for by other costs, making the benefit sharing arrangement inequitable for fishers. Two key reforms, immediate market-linked upward revision of sale-price at which fish caught by fishers are collected by the contractors (from INR 33/kg to INR 65/kg), and long-term organization of fisher cooperatives as empowered collectives able to exercise their agency and co-manage the resource, are essential to ensure the fishers do not become captive labourers.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management
Lakes and Reservoirs: Research and Management Environmental Science-Water Science and Technology
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
29
期刊介绍: Lakes & Reservoirs: Research and Management aims to promote environmentally sound management of natural and artificial lakes, consistent with sustainable development policies. This peer-reviewed Journal publishes international research on the management and conservation of lakes and reservoirs to facilitate the international exchange of results.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信