去中心化防御:利用区块链对抗联合学习系统中的中毒攻击

Rashmi Thennakoon, Arosha Wanigasundara, Sanjaya Weerasinghe, Chatura Seneviratne, Yushan Siriwardhana, Madhusanka Liyanage
{"title":"去中心化防御:利用区块链对抗联合学习系统中的中毒攻击","authors":"Rashmi Thennakoon, Arosha Wanigasundara, Sanjaya Weerasinghe, Chatura Seneviratne, Yushan Siriwardhana, Madhusanka Liyanage","doi":"10.1109/CCNC51664.2024.10454688","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Federated learning (FL) has become the next generation of machine learning (ML) by avoiding local data sharing with a central server. While this becomes a major advantage to client-side privacy, it has a trade-off of becoming vulnerable to poisoning attacks and malicious behavior of the central server. As the decentralization of systems enhances security concerns, integrating decentralized defense for the existing FL systems has been extensively studied to eliminate the security issues of FL systems. This paper proposes a decentralized defense approach to FL systems with blockchain technology to overcome the poisoning attack without affecting the existing FL system's performance. We introduce a reliable blockchain-based FL (BCFL) architecture in two different models, namely, Centralized Aggregated BCFL (CA-BCFL) and Fully Decentralized BCFL (FD-BCFL). Both models utilize secure off-chain computations for malicious mitigation as an alternative to high-cost on-chain computations. Our comprehensive analysis shows that the proposed BCFL architectures can defend in a similar manner against poisoning attacks that compromise the aggregator. As a better measure, the paper has included an evaluation of the gas consumption of our two system models.","PeriodicalId":518411,"journal":{"name":"2024 IEEE 21st Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)","volume":"94 10","pages":"950-955"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decentralized Defense: Leveraging Blockchain against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning Systems\",\"authors\":\"Rashmi Thennakoon, Arosha Wanigasundara, Sanjaya Weerasinghe, Chatura Seneviratne, Yushan Siriwardhana, Madhusanka Liyanage\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CCNC51664.2024.10454688\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Federated learning (FL) has become the next generation of machine learning (ML) by avoiding local data sharing with a central server. While this becomes a major advantage to client-side privacy, it has a trade-off of becoming vulnerable to poisoning attacks and malicious behavior of the central server. As the decentralization of systems enhances security concerns, integrating decentralized defense for the existing FL systems has been extensively studied to eliminate the security issues of FL systems. This paper proposes a decentralized defense approach to FL systems with blockchain technology to overcome the poisoning attack without affecting the existing FL system's performance. We introduce a reliable blockchain-based FL (BCFL) architecture in two different models, namely, Centralized Aggregated BCFL (CA-BCFL) and Fully Decentralized BCFL (FD-BCFL). Both models utilize secure off-chain computations for malicious mitigation as an alternative to high-cost on-chain computations. Our comprehensive analysis shows that the proposed BCFL architectures can defend in a similar manner against poisoning attacks that compromise the aggregator. As a better measure, the paper has included an evaluation of the gas consumption of our two system models.\",\"PeriodicalId\":518411,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2024 IEEE 21st Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)\",\"volume\":\"94 10\",\"pages\":\"950-955\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2024 IEEE 21st Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC51664.2024.10454688\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2024 IEEE 21st Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC51664.2024.10454688","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

通过避免与中央服务器共享本地数据,联合学习(FL)已成为下一代机器学习(ML)。虽然这对客户端的隐私保护有很大好处,但同时也容易受到中毒攻击和中央服务器恶意行为的影响。由于系统的去中心化增强了安全问题,为消除 FL 系统的安全问题,人们对现有 FL 系统的去中心化防御进行了广泛研究。本文提出了一种利用区块链技术对 FL 系统进行去中心化防御的方法,以在不影响现有 FL 系统性能的情况下克服中毒攻击。我们介绍了一种可靠的基于区块链的 FL(BCFL)架构,它有两种不同的模式,即集中式聚合 BCFL(CA-BCFL)和完全去中心化 BCFL(FD-BCFL)。这两种模式都利用安全的链外计算来减少恶意,以替代高成本的链上计算。我们的综合分析表明,所提出的 BCFL 架构能以类似的方式抵御危及聚合器的中毒攻击。作为更好的衡量标准,本文还包括对两种系统模型耗气量的评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Decentralized Defense: Leveraging Blockchain against Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning Systems
Federated learning (FL) has become the next generation of machine learning (ML) by avoiding local data sharing with a central server. While this becomes a major advantage to client-side privacy, it has a trade-off of becoming vulnerable to poisoning attacks and malicious behavior of the central server. As the decentralization of systems enhances security concerns, integrating decentralized defense for the existing FL systems has been extensively studied to eliminate the security issues of FL systems. This paper proposes a decentralized defense approach to FL systems with blockchain technology to overcome the poisoning attack without affecting the existing FL system's performance. We introduce a reliable blockchain-based FL (BCFL) architecture in two different models, namely, Centralized Aggregated BCFL (CA-BCFL) and Fully Decentralized BCFL (FD-BCFL). Both models utilize secure off-chain computations for malicious mitigation as an alternative to high-cost on-chain computations. Our comprehensive analysis shows that the proposed BCFL architectures can defend in a similar manner against poisoning attacks that compromise the aggregator. As a better measure, the paper has included an evaluation of the gas consumption of our two system models.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信