司法监护人:法院遏制法案、最高法院和司法审查

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
Lisa Hager, A. Uribe-McGuire
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引用次数: 0

摘要

以往的研究表明,最高法院的法官会遵从国会的偏好,在国会提出遏制法院的法案后,通过较少地否决国会法案来恢复司法机构的制度合法性。这假定最高法院充当了整个司法机构的监护人,但之前的研究并未明确检验这一点。我们创建了 "监护人 "行为理论,并检验了最高法院在法院遏制法案出台后采取这种行为的可能性。我们发现,最高法院会积极纠正下级法院的司法审查案例,这比之前的观点更为有力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Judicial Guardians: Court-Curbing Bills, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review
Previous studies show that Supreme Court justices defer to congressional preferences by striking down fewer Acts of Congress to restore the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy following the introduction of court-curbing bills. This assumes the Supreme Court acts as a guardian of the entire judiciary, but prior work has not explicitly tested this. We create a theory of “guardian” behavior and test the likelihood that the Court engages in this behavior following the introduction of court-curbing bills. We find that the Supreme Court actively corrects lower court instances of judicial review, a stronger response than previously suggested.
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CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
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