Efficient First-price Sealed E-auction Protocol Under Secure Multi-party Computational Malicious Model

To solve the problems of existing e-auction protocols such as semi-trustworthiness of outsourced third parties, collusive attacks among participants, unsatisfactory decentralized structure, and inability of public verification, we propose an efficient first-price sealed e-auction protocol under a secure multi-party computational malicious model. First, the protocol combines the additive homomorphism of the ElGamal cryptographic algorithm to achieve a decentralized structure and eliminate the problem of semi-trustworthiness of outsourced third parties; it uses (n, n) threshold encryption and decryption techniques to solve the problem of collusion attacks among participants and uses Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) technology to achieve public verifiability of auction results. Additionally, the protocol proposes a method to quickly find the maximum value of the data encoding, which can avoid multiple processing of confidential data and thus effectively reduce the number of communication rounds. The combination of zero-knowledge proof and ideal/realistic simulation paradigm proves that the protocol in this paper is resistant to up to n-1 party collusion attacks and satisfies the security of the secure multi-party computational malicious model. Finally, after theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, the protocol not only satisfies higher security performance but also has greater overall operational efficiency.