商业网络中的知识共享和累积创新

Gilles Saint-Paul
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们如何解释共享创新的企业合作网络(如硅谷或开源社区)的成功?本文表明,如果创新是累积性的,那么如果企业希望从其他企业未来的改进中获益,那么向企业网络公开一项发明可能是有价值的。本文证明,在某些条件下,所有创新都公开的合作均衡是存在的。此外,这种均衡并不依赖于偏离后的惩罚策略:无论其他公司在偏离后采取何种行动,不偏离都是最优选择。网络中企业数量越多,合作均衡越有可能出现。当研发努力是内生的时,合作均衡与企业研发努力之间的战略互补性有关,这可能导致多重均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knowledge Sharing and Cumulative Innovation in Business Networks
How can we explain the success of cooperative networks of firms which share innovations, such as Silicon Valley or the Open Source community? This paper shows that if innovations are cumulative, making an invention publicly available to a network of firms may be valuable if the firm expects to benefit from future improvements made by other firms. A cooperative equilibrium where all innovations are made public is shown to exist under certain conditions. Furthermore, such an equilibrium does not rest on punishment strategies being followed after a deviation: it is optimal not to deviate regardless of another firm’s actions following a deviation. A cooperative equilibrium is more likely to arise the greater the number of firms in the network. When R&D effort is endogenous, cooperative equilibria are associated with strategic complementarities between firms’ research effort, which may lead to multiple equilibria.
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