Savannah (Yuanyuan) Guo, Pritam Saha, Leyuan You, Michael Zheng
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Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? Evidence from brokerage mergers and closures
We document that firms in competitive industries experience significantly more deterioration in financial reporting quality after a reduction in analyst coverage due to brokerage closures or mergers, as compared to firms in noncompetitive industries. Most of the effects are mainly driven by firms with smaller initial analyst coverage, lower institutional ownership and greater financial constraints. Importantly, we further show that after brokerage exits, managerial slack increases more for firms in noncompetitive than competitive industries. Consistent with the notion that agency manifestation can take different forms, we provide evidence that competition may curtail some agency issues, such as managerial slack, while also exacerbating other agency issues, such as financial misreporting.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting exists to publish high quality research papers in accounting, corporate finance, corporate governance and their interfaces. The interfaces are relevant in many areas such as financial reporting and communication, valuation, financial performance measurement and managerial reward and control structures. A feature of JBFA is that it recognises that informational problems are pervasive in financial markets and business organisations, and that accounting plays an important role in resolving such problems. JBFA welcomes both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, theoretical papers should yield novel testable implications, and empirical papers should be theoretically well-motivated. The Editors view accounting and finance as being closely related to economics and, as a consequence, papers submitted will often have theoretical motivations that are grounded in economics. JBFA, however, also seeks papers that complement economics-based theorising with theoretical developments originating in other social science disciplines or traditions. While many papers in JBFA use econometric or related empirical methods, the Editors also welcome contributions that use other empirical research methods. Although the scope of JBFA is broad, it is not a suitable outlet for highly abstract mathematical papers, or empirical papers with inadequate theoretical motivation. Also, papers that study asset pricing, or the operations of financial markets, should have direct implications for one or more of preparers, regulators, users of financial statements, and corporate financial decision makers, or at least should have implications for the development of future research relevant to such users.
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