{"title":"多元化企业集团的社会联系与创新","authors":"Tomas Jandik, Tatiana Salikhova","doi":"10.1111/jfir.12395","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the effect of social connections between divisional managers and CEO on the scale and success of innovation activities in US diversified conglomerates. Divisional managers who previously worked or studied with the CEO file a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These patents receive more citations in the future and represent a greater scientific and economic value. To provide causal support for our findings, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in connections caused by CEO nonperformance-related retirements. The difference-in-differences estimation shows that after the CEO leaves the office, connected segments experience a drop in the quantity and quality of innovation activities. The effect of connections to the CEO on innovation outcomes is stronger in firms with high internal information asymmetry. These findings can imply that social connections help to mitigate adverse selection problems associated with risky R&D investments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47584,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Research","volume":"47 4","pages":"1135-1163"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social connections and innovation in diversified conglomerates\",\"authors\":\"Tomas Jandik, Tatiana Salikhova\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jfir.12395\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We study the effect of social connections between divisional managers and CEO on the scale and success of innovation activities in US diversified conglomerates. Divisional managers who previously worked or studied with the CEO file a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These patents receive more citations in the future and represent a greater scientific and economic value. To provide causal support for our findings, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in connections caused by CEO nonperformance-related retirements. The difference-in-differences estimation shows that after the CEO leaves the office, connected segments experience a drop in the quantity and quality of innovation activities. The effect of connections to the CEO on innovation outcomes is stronger in firms with high internal information asymmetry. These findings can imply that social connections help to mitigate adverse selection problems associated with risky R&D investments.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47584,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"volume\":\"47 4\",\"pages\":\"1135-1163\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jfir.12395\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Research","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jfir.12395","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Social connections and innovation in diversified conglomerates
We study the effect of social connections between divisional managers and CEO on the scale and success of innovation activities in US diversified conglomerates. Divisional managers who previously worked or studied with the CEO file a greater number of patents during their tenure at the segment. These patents receive more citations in the future and represent a greater scientific and economic value. To provide causal support for our findings, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in connections caused by CEO nonperformance-related retirements. The difference-in-differences estimation shows that after the CEO leaves the office, connected segments experience a drop in the quantity and quality of innovation activities. The effect of connections to the CEO on innovation outcomes is stronger in firms with high internal information asymmetry. These findings can imply that social connections help to mitigate adverse selection problems associated with risky R&D investments.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial Research(JFR) is a quarterly academic journal sponsored by the Southern Finance Association (SFA) and the Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA). It has been continuously published since 1978 and focuses on the publication of original scholarly research in various areas of finance such as investment and portfolio management, capital markets and institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and capital investment. The JFR, also known as the Journal of Financial Research, provides a platform for researchers to contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of finance.
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