股东协议何时增值？缓解家族企业中超级负责人与代理机构的冲突

IF 7.8 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-29 DOI:10.1177/10422587241238006

Peter Jaskiewicz, François Belot, James G. Combs, Emmanuel Boutron, Céline Barrédy

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引用次数: 0

摘要

关于股东协议（SAs）会提升还是会损害公司价值，研究人员意见不一。我们将家族企业作为股东协议增加价值的背景，并解释了原因；股东协议限制了家族所有者与其他家族成员之间的 "超级主要 "代理冲突。我们对法国企业进行了小组研究，并对法国首次公开募股进行了第二次研究，结果显示，与非家族企业相比，股东更看重家族企业的战略管理。在家族企业中，当薄弱的治理削弱了家族所有者对其他家族成员要求的抵制时，SAs 会带来更大的价值。我们的研究有助于调和关于SAs的相互竞争的理论，并将超级委托人冲突与其他家族企业代理问题区分开来。

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When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms

Researchers are divided on whether shareholder agreements (SAs) improve or hurt firm value. We offer family firms as a context where SAs add value and explain why; SAs limit “superprincipal” agency conflicts between family owners and other family members. A panel of French firms and a second study of French Initial Public Offerings show shareholders value SAs more in family than in nonfamily firms. Among family firms, SAs add greater value when weak governance undermines family owners’ resistance to other family members’ demands. Our study helps reconcile competing theory about SAs and distinguishes superprincipal conflicts from other family-firm agency problems.

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来源期刊

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice BUSINESS-

CiteScore

19.00

自引率

12.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (ETP) is an interdisciplinary scholarly journal dedicated to conceptual and empirical research that advances, tests, or extends theory relating to entrepreneurship in its broadest sense. Article Topics: Topics covered in ETP include, but are not limited to: New Venture Creation, Development, Growth, and Performance Characteristics, Behaviors, and Types of Entrepreneurs Small Business Management Family-Owned Businesses Corporate, Social, and Sustainable Entrepreneurship National and International Studies of Enterprise Creation Research Methods in Entrepreneurship Venture Financing Content: The journal publishes articles that explore these topics through rigorous theoretical development, empirical analysis, and methodological innovation. ETP serves as a platform for advancing our understanding of entrepreneurship and its implications for individuals, organizations, and society.