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引用次数: 0
摘要
在《信条的对象》（Objects of Credence）一书的第六章中，安娜-马赫塔尼（Anna Mahtani）认为信条的不透明性给 "主要原则"（Principle Principle）带来了困难，并提出了一个修订的信条与机缘相关的原则来避免这一困难。在这篇对她的书的评论中，我既为马赫塔尼提出的原则辩护，使其免受微不足道的指控，也论证了信念的不透明性并不威胁偶然性在指导信念中的作用。
The Principal Principle and the contingent a priori
In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence, Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani’s proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence.
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