快讯首席执行官的竞争进取心与研发投资的二元垄断分析

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Xing Gao, Yanfang Zhang, Boyuan Zhong, Xifan Wang, Ying Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然在研发(研究与开发)投入巨大的竞争性行业中经常可以观察到首席执行官的竞争进取心,但有关其对竞争企业的研发战略和招聘战略的影响的研究却很少见。本文建立了一个基于库诺博弈的模型来研究这一问题,并在竞争性双头垄断市场中获得了许多新发现。特别是,与两家公司聘用非竞争性首席执行官相比,当竞争性首席执行官的攻击性相对较弱时,聘用竞争性首席执行官可能会阻碍而不是刺激研发投资。我们的分析表明,尽管存在利益冲突,企业仍可能选择聘用有竞争力的首席执行官。具体来说,当竞争性首席执行官的进取心相对较弱时,两家公司都会聘用竞争性首席执行官,以获得产出优势;反之,它们会聘用不同类型的首席执行官,以避免正面竞争。当两家公司都选择有竞争力的首席执行官时,就会出现囚徒困境,因为如果雇用无竞争力的首席执行官,两家公司的收益会更好。那么,尽管竞争性首席执行官的存在总是会提高行业总产出,但双边竞争会带来最低的行业总利润,因为激烈的产出竞争会大幅降低价格。有趣的是,当竞争性首席执行官的进取心仍然相当强时,单边竞争会提高行业总利润。最后,本研究表明,竞争性首席执行官的内生攻击性并不会从本质上改变这些主要结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXPRESS: A Duopolistic Analysis of CEO Competitive Aggressiveness with R&D Investment
While CEO competitive aggressiveness can be frequently observed in competitive industries with heavy R&D (research and development) investment, studies on its impact on R&D strategies and hiring strategies for competing firms are rare. This article builds a Cournot-based game model to examine this issue and obtain many novel findings in a competitive duopolistic market. In particular, compared with two firms hiring noncompetitive CEOs, hiring competitive CEOs may hinder rather than stimulate R&D investment when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains relatively weak. Our analysis reveals that despite conflicting interests, firms may choose to hire competitive CEOs. Specifically, when competitive CEOs’ aggressiveness is rather low, both firms hire competitive CEOs to gain an output advantage; otherwise, they hire different types of CEOs to avoid head-to-head competition. A prisoner dilemma occurs when two firms choose competitive CEOs because they would be better off when hiring noncompetitive CEOs. Then, although the presence of competitive CEOs always improves total industry output, bilateral competition brings about the lowest total industry profit because fierce output competition substantially reduces prices. Interestingly, unilateral competition enhances total industry profit when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains rather strong. Finally, this study shows that the endogenous aggressive nature of competitive CEOs does not qualitatively alter these main results.
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来源期刊
Production and Operations Management
Production and Operations Management 管理科学-工程:制造
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
16.00%
发文量
278
审稿时长
24 months
期刊介绍: The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.
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