Xing Gao, Yanfang Zhang, Boyuan Zhong, Xifan Wang, Ying Wang
{"title":"快讯首席执行官的竞争进取心与研发投资的二元垄断分析","authors":"Xing Gao, Yanfang Zhang, Boyuan Zhong, Xifan Wang, Ying Wang","doi":"10.1177/10591478241238971","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While CEO competitive aggressiveness can be frequently observed in competitive industries with heavy R&D (research and development) investment, studies on its impact on R&D strategies and hiring strategies for competing firms are rare. This article builds a Cournot-based game model to examine this issue and obtain many novel findings in a competitive duopolistic market. In particular, compared with two firms hiring noncompetitive CEOs, hiring competitive CEOs may hinder rather than stimulate R&D investment when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains relatively weak. Our analysis reveals that despite conflicting interests, firms may choose to hire competitive CEOs. Specifically, when competitive CEOs’ aggressiveness is rather low, both firms hire competitive CEOs to gain an output advantage; otherwise, they hire different types of CEOs to avoid head-to-head competition. A prisoner dilemma occurs when two firms choose competitive CEOs because they would be better off when hiring noncompetitive CEOs. Then, although the presence of competitive CEOs always improves total industry output, bilateral competition brings about the lowest total industry profit because fierce output competition substantially reduces prices. Interestingly, unilateral competition enhances total industry profit when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains rather strong. Finally, this study shows that the endogenous aggressive nature of competitive CEOs does not qualitatively alter these main results.","PeriodicalId":4,"journal":{"name":"ACS Applied Energy Materials","volume":"20 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"EXPRESS: A Duopolistic Analysis of CEO Competitive Aggressiveness with R&D Investment\",\"authors\":\"Xing Gao, Yanfang Zhang, Boyuan Zhong, Xifan Wang, Ying Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10591478241238971\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While CEO competitive aggressiveness can be frequently observed in competitive industries with heavy R&D (research and development) investment, studies on its impact on R&D strategies and hiring strategies for competing firms are rare. This article builds a Cournot-based game model to examine this issue and obtain many novel findings in a competitive duopolistic market. In particular, compared with two firms hiring noncompetitive CEOs, hiring competitive CEOs may hinder rather than stimulate R&D investment when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains relatively weak. Our analysis reveals that despite conflicting interests, firms may choose to hire competitive CEOs. Specifically, when competitive CEOs’ aggressiveness is rather low, both firms hire competitive CEOs to gain an output advantage; otherwise, they hire different types of CEOs to avoid head-to-head competition. A prisoner dilemma occurs when two firms choose competitive CEOs because they would be better off when hiring noncompetitive CEOs. Then, although the presence of competitive CEOs always improves total industry output, bilateral competition brings about the lowest total industry profit because fierce output competition substantially reduces prices. Interestingly, unilateral competition enhances total industry profit when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains rather strong. Finally, this study shows that the endogenous aggressive nature of competitive CEOs does not qualitatively alter these main results.\",\"PeriodicalId\":4,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Applied Energy Materials\",\"volume\":\"20 4\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Applied Energy Materials\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478241238971\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"材料科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"CHEMISTRY, PHYSICAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Applied Energy Materials","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478241238971","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"材料科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"CHEMISTRY, PHYSICAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
EXPRESS: A Duopolistic Analysis of CEO Competitive Aggressiveness with R&D Investment
While CEO competitive aggressiveness can be frequently observed in competitive industries with heavy R&D (research and development) investment, studies on its impact on R&D strategies and hiring strategies for competing firms are rare. This article builds a Cournot-based game model to examine this issue and obtain many novel findings in a competitive duopolistic market. In particular, compared with two firms hiring noncompetitive CEOs, hiring competitive CEOs may hinder rather than stimulate R&D investment when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains relatively weak. Our analysis reveals that despite conflicting interests, firms may choose to hire competitive CEOs. Specifically, when competitive CEOs’ aggressiveness is rather low, both firms hire competitive CEOs to gain an output advantage; otherwise, they hire different types of CEOs to avoid head-to-head competition. A prisoner dilemma occurs when two firms choose competitive CEOs because they would be better off when hiring noncompetitive CEOs. Then, although the presence of competitive CEOs always improves total industry output, bilateral competition brings about the lowest total industry profit because fierce output competition substantially reduces prices. Interestingly, unilateral competition enhances total industry profit when the aggressiveness of competitive CEOs remains rather strong. Finally, this study shows that the endogenous aggressive nature of competitive CEOs does not qualitatively alter these main results.
期刊介绍:
ACS Applied Energy Materials is an interdisciplinary journal publishing original research covering all aspects of materials, engineering, chemistry, physics and biology relevant to energy conversion and storage. The journal is devoted to reports of new and original experimental and theoretical research of an applied nature that integrate knowledge in the areas of materials, engineering, physics, bioscience, and chemistry into important energy applications.