快讯:在有更多信息的情况下说服怀疑者和粉丝

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Tamer Boyacı, Soudipta Chakraborty, Huseyin Gurkan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是这样一个信息设计问题:一家需求最大化的公司向市场推出了一种质量未知的产品,而市场上的客户对产品的质量有着不同的先验信念。该公司向所有客户公开披露质量信息。这些客户随后可以选择从企业无法控制的渠道获取有关产品的额外信息,但需要支付一定的费用。企业在推出新产品之前,通常会进行公开的试点测试或征求意见领袖的评论,以便让潜在客户了解产品的质量。为了分析这个问题,我们构建了一个企业与客户之间的贝叶斯说服博弈理论模型。我们描述了企业的最优信息政策,并证明它可以根据市场特征,从完全披露质量到夸大或淡化质量,再到完全不披露质量。我们描述了市场异质性和获取额外信息对企业最优信息披露政策的影响。我们的分析为企业设计信息提供策略以及针对不同市场特征实施这些策略提供了管理指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXPRESS: Persuading Skeptics and Fans in the Presence of Additional Information
We consider the information design problem of a demand-maximizing firm launching a product of unknown quality to a market consisting of customers who have heterogeneous prior beliefs about quality. The firm publicly discloses information about quality to all customers. These customers can subsequently opt to acquire additional information about the product at a cost from sources beyond the firm's control. Our study is motivated by the common practice of firms conducting public pilot tests or soliciting reviews from opinion leaders before launching a new product to inform potential customers about its quality. To analyze this problem, we construct a game-theoretic model of Bayesian persuasion between the firm and its customers. We characterize the firm's optimal information policy and show that it can range from fully disclosing quality to exaggerating or downplaying quality to not disclosing quality at all depending on market characteristics. We delineate the impact of market heterogeneity and access to additional information on the optimal information disclosure policy of the firm. Our analysis provides managerial guidance for firms in designing information provision strategies and operationalizing them for different market characteristics.
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来源期刊
Production and Operations Management
Production and Operations Management 管理科学-工程:制造
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
16.00%
发文量
278
审稿时长
24 months
期刊介绍: The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.
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