The Impact of Minority Veto in Consociational Democracies

Developing governance models that are suitable for the effective management of ethnically divided societies arising from conflicts presents a significant challenge for both scholars and peace mediators. The consociational model, founded on power-sharing principles, has emerged as a means of guiding groups which were previously in conflict towards creating institutional frameworks that can help manage divisions and promote peaceful coexistence. In situations where mutual trust is lacking and deep-seated ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions persist, it is unrealistic to anticipate that minority groups would willingly grant unrestricted decision-making authority to the majority. Consequently, the notion of constraining the majority’s decision-making powers on specific matters, unless it has the consent of minority groups through the implementation of veto rights, has become a fundamental principle for negotiating post-conflict institutional arrangements. This article aims to investigate the practical ramifications of veto rights within consociational systems, focusing on their incorporation into Kosovo’s legal framework post-2008 and their actual implementation in the years that followed. The article seeks to shed light on how veto rights contribute to consensus-based decision-making, the potential for disruption when exploited by irresponsible political leaders, and the possibilities of revisiting these arrangements to address any shortcomings.