地方财政对州优先权的反应:马萨诸塞州第 2½ 号提案税收公投案例研究

Shu Wang, Yonghong Wu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

以税收和支出限制为形式的州政府优先权极大地限制了地方政府的创收能力。为了深入了解地方政府如何通过直接民主应对财政优先权,本研究重点关注马萨诸塞州推翻 2½ 号提案规定的征税限制的税收公投。我们以 2010 年至 2021 年的 320 个城市为样本进行分析,研究了财政松弛资源和税收负担对税款限额超限和豁免的影响。我们的分析将税收公投过程分为两个阶段,强调了不同决策者的参与:提出公投的地方官员和批准公投的个人选民。我们发现,由于财政资源不断减少,市政当局有寻求税收公投的动机,但居民的税收负担可能会阻碍这种追求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Local Fiscal Response to State Preemption: A Case Study of Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½ Tax Referendum
State preemption in the form of tax and expenditure limits significantly limits local revenue-raising capacity. To gain insights into how local governments respond to fiscal preemption through direct democracy, this study focuses on tax referenda that override the levy limit set by Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts. Analyzing a sample of 320 municipalities from 2010 to 2021, we investigate the influence of fiscal slack resources and tax burden on the levy limit overrides and exclusions. Our analysis breaks down the tax referendum process into two stages, highlighting the involvement of different decision-makers: local officials proposing the referendum and individual voters approving it. We find that municipalities are motivated to seek tax referenda due to diminishing fiscal slack resources, yet the tax burden on residents can discourage such pursuits.
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