{"title":"基于全等简单配线作用的密钥交换协议的密码分析","authors":"A. Otero Sánchez, J. A. López Ramos","doi":"10.1142/s0219498825502299","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings.</p>","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cryptanalysis of a key exchange protocol based on a congruence-simple semiring action\",\"authors\":\"A. Otero Sánchez, J. A. López Ramos\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/s0219498825502299\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"100\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219498825502299\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219498825502299","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cryptanalysis of a key exchange protocol based on a congruence-simple semiring action
We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings.