当权力不是个人的,而是职位的时候:首席执行官权力的好处

Ariful Islam, Harjinder Singh, Nigar Sultana, Sue Wright
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了公司现金持有量与首席执行官权力类型之间的联系,以及这些权力类型如何影响公司业绩。我们运用代理和管理理论区分了两类首席执行官权力:一类是首席执行官职位带来的权力,另一类是首席执行官个人特征带来的权力。以指数的形式衡量,我们发现这两种权力无论是单独还是结合在一起,都与现金持有量呈正相关,但只有现金持有量较高的职位权力与公司业绩呈正相关。我们的研究结果表明是稳健的,并表明个人权力高的首席执行官对现金持有量的审查可能是审慎的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When it's not personal but positional: The upside of CEO power
We examine links between corporate cash holdings and types of CEO power, and how these affect firm performance, using agency and stewardship theories to distinguish two types of CEO power: one attributable to the CEO position, and one attributable to CEO personal characteristics. Measured as indices, we find positive associations with cash holdings for both types of power, individually and in combination, but only positional power with higher cash holdings is positively associated with firm performance. Our findings are shown to be robust and suggest that scrutiny of cash holdings by CEOs with high personal power may be prudent.
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