{"title":"首席执行官的过度谨慎与资本结构选择","authors":"Francesco Rocciolo, Andrea Gheno, Chris Brooks","doi":"10.1111/fire.12383","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper develops and empirically tests a new version of the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure choices that accounts for CEOs' biased beliefs, with a focus on overcaution. We characterize the bias as a distortion of expected rates of return on equity and debt that, for Overcautious CEOs, are overestimated compared to a rational CEO. The theory shows that if CEOs have higher bias in equity, than in debt-value estimation, overcautious CEOs will choose lower levels of debt compared to rational CEOs, and, if the degree of overcaution is sufficiently high, they will adopt a zero-leverage policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"59 3","pages":"719-743"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12383","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO overcaution and capital structure choices\",\"authors\":\"Francesco Rocciolo, Andrea Gheno, Chris Brooks\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/fire.12383\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This paper develops and empirically tests a new version of the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure choices that accounts for CEOs' biased beliefs, with a focus on overcaution. We characterize the bias as a distortion of expected rates of return on equity and debt that, for Overcautious CEOs, are overestimated compared to a rational CEO. The theory shows that if CEOs have higher bias in equity, than in debt-value estimation, overcautious CEOs will choose lower levels of debt compared to rational CEOs, and, if the degree of overcaution is sufficiently high, they will adopt a zero-leverage policy.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47617,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"FINANCIAL REVIEW\",\"volume\":\"59 3\",\"pages\":\"719-743\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12383\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"FINANCIAL REVIEW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12383\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fire.12383","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops and empirically tests a new version of the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure choices that accounts for CEOs' biased beliefs, with a focus on overcaution. We characterize the bias as a distortion of expected rates of return on equity and debt that, for Overcautious CEOs, are overestimated compared to a rational CEO. The theory shows that if CEOs have higher bias in equity, than in debt-value estimation, overcautious CEOs will choose lower levels of debt compared to rational CEOs, and, if the degree of overcaution is sufficiently high, they will adopt a zero-leverage policy.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
