虚伪与认识论的不公正

IF 1 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI:10.1007/s10677-024-10442-3

Brian Carey

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这篇文章中，我认为我们应该从认识论不公正的角度来理解某些形式的虚伪行为；认识论不公正是指一个人作为认识者的身份受到了损害。如果我们每个人都有兴趣了解道德对我们的要求，那么当虚伪行为通过歪曲假定道德义务的要求性来扭曲我们对道德景观的认知时，这种兴趣就会受到损害。这表明，关于虚伪行为不法性的完整理论必须将虚伪行为解释为认识论上的不公正。

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Hypocrisy and Epistemic Injustice

In this article I argue that we should understand some forms of hypocritical behaviour in terms of epistemic injustice; a type of injustice in which a person is wronged in their capacity as a knower. If each of us has an interest in knowing what morality requires of us, this can be undermined when hypocritical behaviour distorts our perception of the moral landscape by misrepresenting the demandingness of putative moral obligations. This suggests that a complete theory of the wrongness of hypocrisy must account for hypocrisy as epistemic injustice.

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来源期刊

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.