在封闭源 TEE 实施中利用 RPMB 身份验证

IF 2 4区 医学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Aya Fukami , Richard Buurke , Zeno Geradts
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引用次数: 0

摘要

嵌入式多媒体卡(eMMC)提供一个名为 "重放保护内存块"(RPMB)的受保护内存区域。为了保护这些设备免遭未经授权的访问,重要数据以验证方式存储在 RPMB 区域。修改 RPMB 数据需要预先共享的验证密钥。在现代设备上,这种预共享密钥只在可信执行环境(TEE)中生成和使用,以防止攻击者访问。在本文中,我们研究了 RPMB 的验证密钥是如何在 eMMC 上编程的。我们发现,该密钥可直接从目标存储芯片中提取。一旦获取,认证密钥就可用于操作存储的数据。此外,某些旨在防止主机系统使用 RPMB 进行重放攻击的安全功能执行不力,也会被攻击者破解。我们的研究结果表明,不安全的 RPMB 实现可以让取证调查人员破解现代智能手机上实现的安全功能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exploiting RPMB authentication in a closed source TEE implementation

Embedded Multimedia Cards (eMMCs) provide a protected memory area called the Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB). eMMCs are commonly used as storage media in modern smartphones. In order to protect these devices from unauthorized access, important data is stored in the RPMB area in an authenticated manner. Modification of the RPMB data requires a pre-shared authentication key. An unauthorized user cannot change the stored data.

On modern devices, this pre-shared key is generated and used exclusively within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) preventing attackers from access. In this paper, we investigate how the authentication key for RPMB is programmed on the eMMC. We found that this key can be extracted directly from the target memory chip. Once obtained, the authentication key can be used to manipulate stored data. In addition, poor implementation of certain security features, aimed at preventing replay attacks using RPMB on the host system can be broken by an attacker. We show how the authentication key can be extracted and how it can be used to break the anti-rollback protection to enable data restoration even after a data wipe operation has been completed.

Our findings show that non-secure RPMB implementations can enable forensic investigators to break security features implemented on modern smartphones.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.90
自引率
15.00%
发文量
87
审稿时长
76 days
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