{"title":"不同权力结构下在线分销渠道的交付安排","authors":"Xiongwei Zhou , Chaoqun Zhu , Dan Cai","doi":"10.1016/j.omega.2024.103070","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logistics delivery is a critical but costly operation in e-commerce. The e-retailer who sells products online may ask the supplier to ship products to customers, and the supplier responds by accepting or rejecting such a delivery proposal. Motivated by these observations, we consider an online distribution channel with two competing suppliers and one common e-retailer and analytically characterize the equilibrium delivery arrangement based on the nonlinear delivery cost in the E-retailer-Stackelberg, Supplier-Stackelberg, and Vertical-Nash games. Our analysis reveals that the market follower might be more willing to deliver products than the market leader in each Stackelberg game. Counterintuitively, the e-retailer prefers undertaking the delivery when there is a large delivery diseconomy under each power structure but prefers asking both suppliers to deliver products when there is a delivery economy (a small delivery diseconomy) in the E-retailer-Stackelberg and Vertical-Nash games (Supplier-Stackelberg game). The suppliers agree to ship products only when the delivery economy is apparent in the E-retailer-Stackelberg game but reject to do so in the Vertical-Nash game; in the Supplier-Stackelberg game, they accept the delivery proposal even though there is a significant delivery diseconomy. Although both suppliers can benefit from refusing to undertake the delivery when there is fierce competition in each Stackelberg game, interestingly, they still agree to do so and trap themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. In each Stackelberg game, only shifting the delivery responsibility to the suppliers might achieve a triple-win situation for the channel members, consumers, and society; in the Vertical-Nash game, however, this situation never occurs, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are invariant to the delivery arrangement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":19529,"journal":{"name":"Omega-international Journal of Management Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Delivery arrangement in online distribution channels under different power structures\",\"authors\":\"Xiongwei Zhou , Chaoqun Zhu , Dan Cai\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.omega.2024.103070\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Logistics delivery is a critical but costly operation in e-commerce. The e-retailer who sells products online may ask the supplier to ship products to customers, and the supplier responds by accepting or rejecting such a delivery proposal. Motivated by these observations, we consider an online distribution channel with two competing suppliers and one common e-retailer and analytically characterize the equilibrium delivery arrangement based on the nonlinear delivery cost in the E-retailer-Stackelberg, Supplier-Stackelberg, and Vertical-Nash games. Our analysis reveals that the market follower might be more willing to deliver products than the market leader in each Stackelberg game. Counterintuitively, the e-retailer prefers undertaking the delivery when there is a large delivery diseconomy under each power structure but prefers asking both suppliers to deliver products when there is a delivery economy (a small delivery diseconomy) in the E-retailer-Stackelberg and Vertical-Nash games (Supplier-Stackelberg game). The suppliers agree to ship products only when the delivery economy is apparent in the E-retailer-Stackelberg game but reject to do so in the Vertical-Nash game; in the Supplier-Stackelberg game, they accept the delivery proposal even though there is a significant delivery diseconomy. Although both suppliers can benefit from refusing to undertake the delivery when there is fierce competition in each Stackelberg game, interestingly, they still agree to do so and trap themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. In each Stackelberg game, only shifting the delivery responsibility to the suppliers might achieve a triple-win situation for the channel members, consumers, and society; in the Vertical-Nash game, however, this situation never occurs, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are invariant to the delivery arrangement.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":19529,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Omega-international Journal of Management Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Omega-international Journal of Management Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048324000379\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Omega-international Journal of Management Science","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048324000379","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
Delivery arrangement in online distribution channels under different power structures
Logistics delivery is a critical but costly operation in e-commerce. The e-retailer who sells products online may ask the supplier to ship products to customers, and the supplier responds by accepting or rejecting such a delivery proposal. Motivated by these observations, we consider an online distribution channel with two competing suppliers and one common e-retailer and analytically characterize the equilibrium delivery arrangement based on the nonlinear delivery cost in the E-retailer-Stackelberg, Supplier-Stackelberg, and Vertical-Nash games. Our analysis reveals that the market follower might be more willing to deliver products than the market leader in each Stackelberg game. Counterintuitively, the e-retailer prefers undertaking the delivery when there is a large delivery diseconomy under each power structure but prefers asking both suppliers to deliver products when there is a delivery economy (a small delivery diseconomy) in the E-retailer-Stackelberg and Vertical-Nash games (Supplier-Stackelberg game). The suppliers agree to ship products only when the delivery economy is apparent in the E-retailer-Stackelberg game but reject to do so in the Vertical-Nash game; in the Supplier-Stackelberg game, they accept the delivery proposal even though there is a significant delivery diseconomy. Although both suppliers can benefit from refusing to undertake the delivery when there is fierce competition in each Stackelberg game, interestingly, they still agree to do so and trap themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. In each Stackelberg game, only shifting the delivery responsibility to the suppliers might achieve a triple-win situation for the channel members, consumers, and society; in the Vertical-Nash game, however, this situation never occurs, and the consumer surplus and social welfare are invariant to the delivery arrangement.
期刊介绍:
Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.